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ARTICLES
VILIFYING THE VIGILANTE:
A NARROWED SCOPE OF CITIZEN’S ARREST
Ira P. Robbins*
The doctrine of citizen’s arrest in the United States has been ig-
nored for far too long.  In every jurisdiction in the United States, a pri-
vate person may lawfully detain another and often may even use physical
force to do so.  Placing such power in the hands of ordinary, untrained
individuals creates the possibility that citizens will misuse or abuse the
privilege, sometimes with serious consequences for both the arrestor and
the arrestee.  This risk is compounded by the disparate treatment of the
citizen’s arrest doctrine in different jurisdictions and the ambiguities in-
herent in many of the doctrine’s key features—such as whether one may
arrest another only on suspicion of a felony, or also for a misdemeanor
or breach of the peace; the level of probable cause required to make an
arrest; the length of detention that is legally permitted; and the appropri-
ate amount of force used to effectuate the arrest.
Citizen’s arrest arose in medieval times as a direct result of the lack
of an organized police force and practical modes of transportation to get
to the scene of a crime expeditiously.  Citizens had a positive duty to
assist the King in seeking out suspected offenders and detaining them.
However, citizen’s arrest is a doctrine whose time should have passed
many decades—or centuries—ago.  As official police forces became the
norm, the need for citizen’s arrest dissipated.  Yet these arrests are still
authorized throughout the United States today, whether by common law
or by statute.
With the core principles of citizen’s arrest in flux, it is exceedingly
difficult for private individuals to understand the doctrine’s subtleties
and to effectuate arrests lawfully, safely, and without fear of reprisal.
Implementation is ripe for abuse.  Moreover, citizen’s arrests performed
by private persons acting collectively as volunteer watch groups, such as
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the Guardian Angels, are equally susceptible to misuse.  Therefore, this
Article recommends drastic restrictions on the scope of the citizen’s ar-
rest doctrine in general and that its use be confined to three categories:
shopkeepers, out-of-jurisdiction police, and private police forces with
appropriate training and oversight.  In all other instances, the doctrine
of citizen’s arrest should be abolished.
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INTRODUCTION
Ask any adult and, more likely than not, a significant number
played the childhood game called cops and robbers.  However, ask the
same group of adults and few will know that they can actually play this
game in real life.  Citizens are legally permitted to play the role of police
officer under the doctrine of citizen’s arrest.  Citizens have the ability—
but not the duty—to arrest for misdemeanors or felonies, or both, de-
pending on the jurisdiction.1  Most states have statutes that permit some
form of citizen’s arrest with various conditions and permutations, result-
ing in a fragmented application of the doctrine in the United States.2
While it is impossible for a police officer to be present at the commission
of every crime, the remedy for this reality should not include granting
arrest powers to ordinary citizens.  The potential abuses associated with
1 See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 837 (West 2015) (authorizing a citizen to arrest for “a
public offense” and for a felony); OR. REV. STAT. § 2935.04 (West 2015) (permitting a citizen
to arrest only for felonies). But see 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-3 (West 2015) (allowing a
citizen to broadly arrest for any offense other than an ordinance violation).
2 See infra Part I.C (outlining the varying state statutes on citizen’s arrest).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-3\CJP301.txt unknown Seq: 3 31-MAY-16 15:53
2016] A NARROWED SCOPE OF CITIZEN’S ARREST 559
citizen’s arrest outweigh its uses, illustrating the need to substantially
refine the doctrine.
Power in the hands of untrained citizens can lead to disastrous re-
sults, not only for the arrestor, but also for the arrestee.  In March 2014, a
disgruntled citizen, Jonathan Pendleton, attempted to arrest law school
professor Tyler Cowen.3  While a class was in progress, Pendleton en-
tered Tyler’s classroom carrying pepper spray, handcuffs, and a Taser-
like device.4  When Cowen resisted the arrest, Pendleton sprayed him in
the eyes with pepper spray.5  Pendleton was arrested and charged with
abduction and malicious injury with a caustic substance.6  He argued that
he was falsely arrested while in the process of making a legal citizen’s
arrest.7  Acting on an alleged personal vendetta, Pendleton decided to
take the law into his own hands, leading to unfortunate results for the
citizen arrestor and arrestee.8
Citizen’s arrest can also be abused in the context of neighborhood
watch groups.  In 2006 in California, a group of citizens dressed in
superhero costumes founded a citizen’s patrol group—called the Xtreme
Justice League—to stop crime and violence in the San Diego area.9  Mr.
Xtreme, the founder of the league, calls the members “the eyes and ears
of the streets.”10  Members dress in costume while on patrol, receive
training on citizen’s arrest, and carry weapons for self-defense.11  Unlike
citizens who inadvertently witness crimes, the members of the Xtreme
3 See Arin Greenwood, Tyler Cowen Pepper Sprayed While Teaching Law School Class
on Vigilantism, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 27, 2014, 1:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/03/27/tyler-cowen-pepper-sprayed_n_5042358.html; see also Rachel Weiner, Tyler
Cowen’s Attacker Thought the Professor Was Controlling His Mind, Cowen Testifies, WASH.
POST (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/tyler-cowens-attacker-
thought-the-professor-was-controlling-his-mind-cowen-testifies/2014/04/29/a4c5b9f4-cfb9-
11e3-b812-0c92213941f4_story.html (reporting that the alleged attacker posted a threat on the
professor’s economist blog ten days before the attack: “If the police and FBI won’t arrest you
for hacking my computer and sexually harassing me over the past several months, I will do it
myself . . . . Either way, one of us is going to prison.”).
4 Weiner, supra note 3. R
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 For another example of citizen’s arrest gone wrong, see Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer
Attempts Citizen’s Arrest in Court; His Attorney Client Calls Murder Charge ‘Stupid,’ A.B.A.
J. (Oct. 5, 2015, 6:15 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyer_attempts_court
room_citizens_arrest_his_attorney_client_calls_murder (detailing an incident where a lawyer
unsuccessfully attempted to arrest an armed investigator in a court room).
9 See About Xtreme Justice League, XTREME JUSTICE LEAGUE, http://www.xtremejustice
league.org/about.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (providing a description of the group).
10 David Sim, Xtreme Justice League: Real-Life Superheroes Fight Crime on the Streets
of San Diego, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2014, 4:07 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/xtreme-
justice-league-real-life-superheroes-fight-crime-streets-san-diego-1472158.
11 See Frequently Asked Questions, XTREME JUSTICE LEAGUE, http://www.xtremejustice
league.org/faq.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2016).
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Justice League actively patrol high crime areas to catch wrongdoers.12
The gay and lesbian community was similarly aroused to action follow-
ing a rise in hate crimes against homosexuals.13  In 1990, a group called
Queer Nation was formed in New York City to focus on eradicating “dis-
crimination, violence, and repression against the LGBT community.”14
Despite some successes, these types of groups can abuse and have
abused the power of citizen’s arrest, raising questions about the quality
of training and oversight that members receive.15  In particular, some
online groups have gone far beyond the parameters of citizen’s arrest and
promoted violent vigilantism over a measured intervention.16
Instead of using the power to arrest criminals, some people use it as
a propaganda or protest tool.  In response to an increase in police shoot-
ings, several protestors in Albuquerque, New Mexico, attempted to place
the police chief under a citizen’s arrest, charging him with “harboring
fugitives from justice at the Albuquerque police department” and “crimes
against humanity.”17  Similar to the protestors in Albuquerque, the co-
founder of an Illinois group, Illinois Leaks,18 made a citizen’s arrest of
12 See, e.g., Sherene Tagharobi & Andie Adams, ‘Xtreme Justice League’ Seeks to Save
North Park, NBC NEWS (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/Xtreme-
Justice-League-Patrols-Streets-of-North-Park-270677561.html (reacting to a recent surge in at-
tacks, members of the Xtreme Justice League were dispatched to protect the area).
13 See Kristin S. Dodge, “Bashing Back”: Gay and Lesbian Street Patrols and the Crim-
inal Justice System, 11 LAW & INEQ. 295, 314–30 (1993) (describing the gay and lesbian
mobilization in response to the lack of police effort to confront and resolve the hate and anti-
gay violence); see also id. at 318 (“The message is simple: queer folk are banding together and
walking the streets in cities around the United States to protect their own.”).  This commenta-
tor argues that the concerns associated with giving citizens the power to arrest are outweighed
by the “current context of violence” against the gay and lesbian community. Id. at 356–57.
14 Queer Nation NY History, QUEER NATION NY, http://queernationny.org/history (last
visited Jan. 21, 2016) (describing the origins of Queer Nation).
15 See John Sodaro, Neighborhood Watch Groups in the Cross Hairs, SALON (June 14,
2012), http://www.salon.com/2012/06/14/neighborhood_watch_groups_in_the_crosshairs/
(explaining the conviction of a neighborhood watch group member for assault and false im-
prisonment after he beat up a sixteen-year-old).
16 The Facebook Vigilantes Catching Thieves?and Punishing Them, BBC TRENDING
(Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-34224196 (explaining the
Facebook phenomenon of “Catch your thief” in Peru, where individuals film themselves im-
posing often violent vigilante justice on perpetrators of crimes).  However, Peru’s interior min-
ister has suggested that this violent movement could be harnessed to promote the proper use of
citizen’s arrest: “Catch your thief yes, but hand him or her over to the police.  Don’t take
justice into your own hands.” Id.
17 See Albuquerque Residents Attempt Citizen’s Arrest of Police Chief, GUARDIAN (May
8, 2014, 9:54 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/08/albuquerque-police-citi
zens-arrest-chief-protests (documenting the events that led to the attempted arrest of the local
police chief).  The protestors marched into the city council chambers where the city leaders
were meeting.  While they demanded the arrest of the police chief, he was not arrested and
quickly left the building without any altercation with the protestors. Id.
18 This group is focused on exposing abuses within the state’s local governments. See
ILLINOIS LEAKS, http://edgarcountywatchdogs.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (focusing on the
group’s posted tag line, “Edgar County Watchdogs”).
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Park District Board members for not allowing public comments at the
board meeting, alleging a violation of the Illinois Open Meetings Act.19
The arrest spurred changes to the open-meetings policy and now the
Board permits up to thirty minutes of public comments at every meet-
ing.20  While this story illustrates that citizen’s arrest can be an effective
measure for legislative reform, using it to subvert political processes ex-
pands the scope of the doctrine beyond keeping the public safe.21
There are clear cases in which the ability for a citizen to arrest is
beneficial—for instance, when a citizen witnesses a hit-and-run acci-
dent.22  Yet, these heartening stories detract from the risks that arise from
permitting citizens to legally make arrests.  An arrest has a profound and
enduring effect on the arrestee.23  An arrestee is publicly humiliated and
stigmatized as a deplorable member of society.24  In addition, the arres-
tee can suffer from emotional distress and lost employment opportuni-
ties.  Since the risks associated with citizen’s arrest are significant and
the consequences are severe, the ability for citizens to make arrests must
be severely curtailed.25
19 Phil Rogers & Patrick McCraney, Entire Park District Board Placed Under Citizen’s
Arrest, NBC CHICAGO (June 26, 2014, 5:56 AM), http://www.nbcchicago.com/investigations/
Entire-Park-District-Board-Placed-Under-Citizens-Arrest-264660331.html.
20 See Debra Cassens Weiss, Citizen’s Arrest of Park District Board Spurs Change in
Open-Meetings Policy, A.B.A. J. (July 7, 2014, 1:56 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/citizens_arrest_of_park_district_board_spurs_change_in_open-meetings_policy (re-
porting on the changes the Board made in response to the attempted citizen’s arrest). See
generally Paul H. Robinson, The Moral Vigilante and Her Cousins in the Shadows, 2015 U.
ILL. L. REV. 401, 477.  Professor Robinson describes the concept of “shadow vigilantism,” in
which protestors “manipulat[e] the system to their own ends as they see others doing to escape
deserved punishment.” Id. at 477.  One example is jury nullification as a form of protest. See
id. at 464–66.
21 In fact, a recent example shows that some citizens intend to threaten both the political
process and public safety through the use of citizen’s arrest. See Kaitlyn Schallhorn, Activist
Vows to Arrest Democratic Lawmaker ‘Under Article 3 Section 3 of the Constitution,’ BLAZE
(Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/09/23/activist-vows-to-arrest-demo
cratic-lawmaker-under-article-3-section-3-of-the-constitution (relating the story of a former
Marine who intends to gather armed troops to arrest lawmakers who voted in favor of a nu-
clear deal with Iran).
22 See, e.g., People v. Harris, 63 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851 (Ct. App. 1967) (characterizing the
arrest as a valid citizen’s arrest when the citizen witnessed the defendant commit a hit-and-run,
followed him, stopped him, and asked him to wait for the police to arrive).
23 See generally Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 298 (1978) (“An arrest . . . is a serious
matter for any person even when no prosecution follows or when an acquittal is obtained.”);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 776 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he invasion and
disruption of a man’s life and privacy which stem from his arrest are ordinarily far greater than
the relatively minor intrusions attending a search of his premises.”).
24 See In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 458 (2d Cir. 1947) (“The stigma [of a wrongful arrest]
cannot be easily erased . . . . [It] is seldom wiped out by a subsequent judgment of not
guilty.”).
25 In its current application, the doctrine of citizen’s arrest has even risen to the level of
absurdity. See Self Arrest Form, EAST POINT POLICE, http://www.eastpointpolice.org/SelfAr
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Part I of this Article examines the history of the citizen’s arrest doc-
trine, beginning with its origins in English common law.  It then surveys
the two ways states have incorporated citizen’s arrest into their jurispru-
dence, whether through common law development or codification.  Part
II reviews the confusion and risks faced by ordinary citizens in perform-
ing a citizen’s arrest, highlighting the need to reduce the scope of the
doctrine as it has been applied in most situations, including private citi-
zen watch groups.  Part III argues that the fundamental principles of ar-
restor training and oversight lie at the heart of an effective use of the
doctrine and advocates for restricting its use to three categories: shop-
keepers detaining suspected shoplifters, police operating outside of their
jurisdiction, and private police forces that have completed mandated
training and have received accreditation from a state-sponsored entity.
In all other instances, the doctrine of citizen’s arrest should be abolished.
Part IV provides a model statute that substantially curtails the scope of
citizen’s arrest.
I. ANALYZING THE RIGHTS CONFERRED UNDER CITIZEN’S ARREST
A. Common Law Origins
The right26 of a citizen to perform an arrest under common law
arose in England during the medieval period.27  The Statute of
Winchester in 1285 outlined the important role of private citizens in the
criminal justice system.28  Citizens were not only given the right to arrest
others who committed a crime, but they also had a positive duty to par-
ticipate in the apprehension of a criminal when the “hue and cry” was
raised.29  The hue and cry was the process by which either a constable or
private citizen would alert nearby able-bodied men to the commission of
a crime.  If the criminal actor refused to be arrested, these citizens had a
duty to “follow them with all the town and the towns near, with hue and
cry from town to town until that they be taken and delivered to the sher-
iff.”30  The distinction between an ability to arrest and a duty to arrest is
restForm.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (providing citizens with a step-by-step process on
how to execute a citizen’s arrest on themselves).
26 The question of whether citizen’s arrest is a “right” or a “privilege” is beyond the
scope of this Article, so the terms are used interchangeably throughout.  For a brief discussion
on this distinction, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CITIZEN’S ARREST: THE LAW OF ARREST,
SEARCH, AND SEIZURE FOR PRIVATE CITIZENS AND PRIVATE POLICE 8 (1977) (explaining that
the authority of a citizen to lawfully perform an arrest is more appropriately labeled a privilege
because no duty to honor an arrest exists).
27 Id. at 9.
28 Statute of Winchester 1285, 13 Edw. 1 c. 1–6 (1285), reprinted in SELECT DOCU-
MENTS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 76–79 (George Burton Adams & H. Morse
Stephens eds., 1901).
29 Id. at 77–78.
30 Id. at 78.
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an important one that can be traced from common law to modern stat-
utes.  At common law, this distinction hinged on the nature of the crime
committed and whether the private citizen actually witnessed the crime.31
These factors help to explain the general structure of statutes extant in
the United States.
At early common law, little or no distinction was made between
arrests performed by a private citizen and those performed by a peace
officer;32 an officer of the King and a private person had the same right
to arrest without a warrant.33  Nor at early common law was any distinc-
tion made regarding the possible liability of the arrestor, either for false
imprisonment or because a crime had not in fact been committed.34  The
Statute of Winchester itself stated that “for the arrestments of such stran-
gers none shall be punished.”35  As the common law developed, how-
ever, both private citizens and peace officers bore the burden of
accuracy—the crime must have actually been committed in order for a
proper arrest to occur.36
As the common law continued to evolve, distinctions arose between
the rights of private citizens to arrest and the rights afforded to peace
officers.  One such distinction concerned the level of suspicion required
by the arrestor to perform the arrest.  A private citizen was required to
have suspicion originating from his own observations, whereas a peace
officer could rely on accounts provided by third parties.37  Although this
distinction appears minor, its importance lies in recognizing that those
responsible for enforcing the law were deemed presumptively more relia-
ble than the average private citizen.38  Consequently, peace officers were
given greater leeway to investigate and arrest for criminal conduct that
they did not personally witness.
Common law citizen’s arrest doctrine progressed in conjunction
with societal developments in England through the seventeenth century.
As population density increased and greater urbanization took hold, the
citizen’s arrest doctrine adapted to place less power in the hands of pri-
vate citizens and more power in the hands of professional law enforce-
31 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 26, at 9–10 (citing commentators who have specified that R
the committed crime must be a felony).
32 See Jerome Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L.
REV. 566, 567 (1936) (summarizing several scholars’ views on the lack of distinction, includ-
ing those of Stephen, Dalton, and Hale).
33 BASSIOUNI, supra note 26, at 9. R
34 See Statute of Winchester, supra note 28, at 78. R
35 Id.
36 Hall, supra note 32, at 568–69. R
37 See id. (explaining that peace officers were punishable by law if they neglected their
duty, thus encouraging proper enforcement of the law).
38 Id.
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ment.39  Private citizens formed organized groups to assist law
enforcement in effectuating citizen’s arrests, but the small scale and
questionable ethics of these groups prevented them from offering sub-
stantial assistance.40  By the eighteenth century, courts began to create
more tangible rules for both law enforcement and private citizens.41  In
1780, in Samuel v. Payne,42 for example, the King’s Bench definitively
established that a law enforcement official could lawfully arrest based on
suspicion that a felony had been committed, even if his suspicion was
incorrect.43  Since private citizens had never been granted such a right,
this development laid the foundation for the modern day principle that a
private citizen making an arrest bears the risk and responsibility where
the citizen incorrectly believes a crime has taken place.  A law enforce-
ment official, on the other hand, need only reasonably believe the crime
has taken place to avoid liability.44  As private citizens no longer had a
duty to arrest criminals, they continued to face liability for false arrests,
while public officials were granted greater latitude pursuant to their offi-
cial duties.
The common law doctrine of citizen’s arrest as developed by the
early nineteenth century has remained largely unchanged to modern
times.  While the doctrine narrowed significantly between the Statute of
Winchester in 1285 and the nineteenth century, judicial decisions over
the last two hundred years have done little to further distill and clarify it.
The rise of more organized and widespread law enforcement entities ren-
dered the standards governing arrests by private citizens an after-
thought.45  In painstakingly prescribing the powers of police as state
actors, legislatures and courts depreciated the citizen’s arrest doctrine by
not imbuing it with a similar level of specificity.  Therefore, the histori-
cal common law doctrine of citizen’s arrest can be summarized suc-
cinctly: A private citizen may arrest another for a crime committed in his
or her presence, but can be held liable for false imprisonment if no crime
was in fact committed.  The reasonableness and diligence of the ar-
39 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 26, at 10 (positing that the role of private citizens in the R
law enforcement process appeared likely to remain limited).
40 See id. (clarifying that some of these groups consisted of people who were thieves
themselves, thereby undercutting the effectiveness of their vigilantism).
41 See Hall, supra note 32, at 570 (asserting that until at least 1765, no distinction was R
made between a public official and a citizen when arresting a felon, but that by 1780 judicial
decisions started to recognize more concrete rules).
42 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B. 1780).
43 Id. at 231.
44 See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 226 (1991) (holding that officers who fall into
this category are entitled to qualified immunity).
45 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 26, at 13 (recognizing that arrest laws became largely fo- R
cused on state action and the acts of public officers, thereby marginalizing the citizen’s arrest
doctrine by not developing it as robustly in statutory law).
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restor’s conduct will not protect the arrestor if the arrestee is innocent of
the crime.  Due to the vagueness and lack of specificity in the common
law doctrine, many states have chosen to codify and expand upon these
rights in an attempt to provide more clarity to citizens.  Other states,
however, have continued to rely on their own formulations of the com-
mon law.
B. The Common Law States
In large part, the lack of specificity and coherence in common law
doctrine stems from the rise of modern police forces and the way in
which those forces diminished the importance of the private citizen as a
potential arrestor.46  Once states began to carefully prescribe arrest pow-
ers for trained law enforcement officials, the need to similarly instruct
private citizens dissipated.47  As a result, a handful of states never codi-
fied the law of citizen’s arrest and instead are still governed by a com-
mon law approach.48  One example is the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, which illuminates how a circumscribed citizen’s arrest
doctrine can arise from common law without official codification.
Massachusetts explicitly recognized a common law right of citizen’s
arrest as early as 1850.49  The right was described as “a much more re-
stricted authority” than the authority granted to peace officers, and one
that was “confined to cases of the actual guilt of the party ar-
rested . . . .”50  Only when the guilt of the arrestee was proven was the
citizen’s arrest deemed justified.51  This mid-nineteenth century ruling
has been echoed in more recent jurisprudence.52  The burden of correct-
ness placed on the arrestor mirrors the historical trend in citizen’s arrest
and represents a significant restriction on a private person’s arrest pow-
ers.53  The requirement of the arrestee’s actual guilt continued to be a
cornerstone of Massachusetts common law for the next century, until
courts began to provide more detail to guide private citizens.54
46 See id. (explaining the resulting disparity in the treatment of public officers and pri-
vate citizens despite the fact that they were performing essentially the same function).
47 Id.
48 The jurisdictions that rely on the common law of citizen’s arrest are Connecticut,
Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Vermont, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin.
49 See Rohan v. Sawin, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 281, 283 (1850).
50 Id. at 285.
51 Id.
52 See Commonwealth v. Harris, 415 N.E.2d 216, 221 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (recogniz-
ing the deterrence benefits provided by reducing the scope of the citizen’s arrest privilege and
highlighting the risk of false imprisonment claims incurred by arrestors).
53 See supra Part I.A.
54 See Commonwealth v. Grise, 496 N.E.2d 162 (Mass. 1986); Commonwealth v.
Lussier, 128 N.E.2d 569 (Mass. 1955); Harris, 415 N.E.2d at 219–21.
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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1955 stated unequivo-
cally that a “private person may lawfully arrest one who in fact has com-
mitted a felony . . . .”55  While this made the rights of a citizen clear
regarding felonies, it did little to show what rights a citizen had to arrest
for a misdemeanor or breach of peace.  In 1986, the court addressed this
possible expansion of citizen’s arrest power in hopes of clarifying the
confusion.56  In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the Supreme Judicial
Court held that private persons could not perform a citizen’s arrest for a
misdemeanor or breach-of-peace violation.57  To allow an arrest for these
offenses might encourage vigilantism due to citizens’ interpretations of a
“breach of peace” as elastic.58  This updated common law doctrine is
similar to other states’ formal codifications.
Several other states have similarly decided not to codify citizen’s
arrest, relying instead on some variant of the common law doctrine.
Pennsylvania’s law exemplifies a common thread throughout the com-
mon law states: a private citizen may arrest another for a felony, but the
citizen does so at his or her peril because the citizen’s suspicion must
ultimately be correct.59  Pennsylvania’s stance on a private citizen’s legal
right to arrest another for a misdemeanor or breach of peace is less
clear.60  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court established that the probable
cause burden on the arrestor is considerably higher when the arrestor is a
private citizen than when the arrestor is an officer of the law, but it did
not clarify whether this standard applies to felonies, misdemeanors, or
both.61  Although Pennsylvania courts have been divided on the validity
of a citizen’s arrest for a non-felony, some have recognized that a purely
common law approach to citizen’s arrest would allow private persons to
arrest for misdemeanors and breaches of the peace.62  The questions sur-
55 Lussier, 128 N.E.2d at 575.
56 See Grise, 496 N.E.2d at 163–65.
57 See id. at 164–65 (excluding intoxication and traffic offenses from the scope of the
doctrine).
58 Id.
59 See Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 242 A.2d 237, 239–40 (Pa. 1968) (stating that a
private person in fresh pursuit of a felon may arrest him, and if the felon flees and the arrest
cannot be performed without killing the felon, such a killing is allowed, but only for an enu-
merated list of felonies: “treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter, mayhem, arson, robbery,
common law rape, common law burglary, kidnapping, assault with the intent to murder, rape
or rob, or a felony which normally causes or threatens death or great bodily harm”).
60 See generally Commonwealth v. Corley, 462 A.2d 1374 (Pa. 1983) (providing a se-
quential history of Pennsylvania holdings and dicta that paints a contradictory picture of a
private citizen’s right to arrest for a misdemeanor or breach of peace).
61 See id. at 1378.
62 See id. at 1379 (outlining the common law rule); see also Samuel v. Blackwell, 76 Pa.
Super. 540, 547 (1921) (dictum) (concurring with the common law rule); Commonwealth v.
Giles, 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 13, 17 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1972) (dictum) (allowing a citizen’s arrest for a
breach of peace occurring in the presence of the arrestor). But see Commonwealth v. Gregg,
396 A.2d 797, 798 n.9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (dictum) (clarifying that a private citizen may
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rounding whether such an approach is currently employed in Penn-
sylvania illustrate the uncertainty that can come with a state’s decision
not to codify the common law.  Ultimately, it appears that common law
citizen’s arrest in Pennsylvania is allowed for a felony, misdemeanor, or
breach of the peace,63 but the jumbled case history and lack of codifica-
tion provide insufficient guidance for private persons to understand the
boundaries of the doctrine.
Reading the common law to restrict citizen’s arrest powers to of-
fenses that the citizen actually witnesses is another recurring theme
among common law states.  In Wisconsin, a citizen can arrest only for
felonies and breaches of the peace so long as that citizen has personally
witnessed the crime.64  Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin all
agree that a felony committed in the arrestor’s presence is sufficient for
arrest and that the arrestor bears the burden of correctness.  Each state’s
varying treatment of misdemeanors and breaches of the peace, however,
highlights the importance of statutory codification as a means of concre-
tizing the modern citizen’s arrest doctrine and avoiding confusion among
ordinary citizens.65
While these three jurisdictions have relatively robust precedent to
indicate their common law stance on citizen’s arrest, other jurisdictions
that have similarly declined codification provide scant case law to offer
guidance.  The result of this lack of relevant jurisprudence is that in some
states, such as Maryland, one singular definition of citizen’s arrest has
been outlined and followed for decades without much evaluation or de-
velopment.66  The Court of Appeals of Maryland determined that the
common law authority for a private person to arrest exists only when
arrest another only for a felony committed in the arrestor’s presence); In re Stanley, 201 A.2d
287, 289 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964) (dictum) (stating that a constable’s right to arrest for breach of
peace was not similarly conferred to private citizens).
63 See Kopko v. Miller, 892 A.2d 766, 774–75 (Pa. 2006) (holding that a private citizen
may arrest for a breach of peace that the citizen personally observes and that a police officer’s
power to arrest for crimes committed in the citizen’s presence is no different from that of a
private citizen).
64 See City of Waukesha v. Gorz, 479 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (disagree-
ing with the trial court’s view that citizen’s arrest would be allowed for any violation of law as
long as the arrestor was a witness).
65 See Radloff v. Nat’l Food Stores, Inc., 123 N.W.2d 570, 571 (Wis. 1963) (specifying
that a private citizen has a right to arrest for a misdemeanor committed in his or her presence
only if public security is at stake and the act threatens to incite violence, a standard that com-
mon theft does not meet); City of Waukesha, 479 N.W.2d at 223 (holding that operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated involves violence and threatens overall public security,
thereby making it a breach of peace sufficient to support a citizen’s arrest); State v. Slawek,
338 N.W.2d 120, 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (reaffirming that a private citizen and a police
officer outside of the jurisdiction may make a citizen’s arrest for both a misdemeanor or a
breach of peace committed in their presence).
66 See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 261 A.2d 731, 738–39 (Md. 1969) (clarifying
that a private shopkeeper has the same rights—and restrictions—as a private citizen).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-3\CJP301.txt unknown Seq: 12 31-MAY-16 15:53
568 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25:557
(a) there is a felony being committed in [the arrestor’s]
presence or when a felony has in fact been committed
whether or not in [the arrestor’s] presence, and the ar-
rester has reasonable ground (probable cause) to believe
the person he arrests has committed it; or (b) a misde-
meanor is being committed in the presence or view of
the arrester which amounts to a breach of the peace.67
This definition—while not formally codified—was subsequently quoted
and followed in Maryland in recent years.68  The clear-cut status of Ma-
ryland’s common law standard through jurisprudence, or lack thereof,
essentially creates a state codification of the citizen’s arrest doctrine.
Some common law states’ jurisprudence offers clarity only on spe-
cific elements of the citizen’s arrest doctrine, rather than on the doctrine
as a whole.  In West Virginia, for example, a nearly hundred-year-old
partial definition of when, with respect to felonies and misdemeanors, a
private citizen may arrest still proves influential to modern courts.69
While the definition does not address breaches of the peace and is con-
fusing at best in its description of a private citizen’s right to arrest for a
misdemeanor, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals cited it as
recently as 2013.70  The right of West Virginia citizens to arrest for mis-
demeanors is governed by the common law, but case law has not suffi-
ciently developed to lend greater clarity to what that common law
standard actually is.71  This highlights one of the most basic benefits of
formal codification: a citizen can look to an official state statute to deter-
mine his or her legal rights, rather than having to rely on piecemeal read-
ings of judicial opinions.
67 Id.
68 See, e.g., United States v. Atwell, 470 F. Supp. 2d 554, 565 (D. Md. 2007) (reiterating
the probable cause standard outlined in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. as it applies to
breaches of the peace); Williams v. State, 79 A.3d 931, 946 n.13 (Md. 2013) (implying that the
definition in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. is still controlling and has remained unchanged
for nearly forty-five years).
69 See Allen v. Lopinsky, 94 S.E. 369, 369–70 (W. Va. 1917) (“Under no circumstances,
can a private person justify an arrest made without a warrant, by himself, or by an officer at his
instance, for a misdemeanor, nor for a felony, unless the felony has been actually
committed.”).
70 See State v. Horn, 750 S.E.2d 248, 262 (W. Va. 2013) (clarifying the doctrine slightly
by examining the responsibilities of police officers outside their jurisdiction); see also State v.
Muegge, 360 S.E.2d 216, 218–19 (W. Va. 1987) (noting that a peace officer making an arrest
outside his or her jurisdiction acts in the same capacity as a private citizen making such an
arrest).
71 See Muegge, 360 S.E.2d at 218–19 (maintaining that, under common law, a private
citizen may arrest another who “commits a misdemeanor in his presence when that misde-
meanor constitutes a breach of the peace”).
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C. State Codifications of the Common Law
Despite the advantages that codification is intended to provide,
many statutes derived from the common law are similarly ambiguous.
While states have enacted several different versions of the citizen’s arrest
doctrine, California provides one of the more typical formulations.72  It
distinguishes between the right to arrest for misdemeanors and felonies.73
Similar to the common law, a citizen can arrest for a misdemeanor com-
mitted in his presence.74  In California, the presence requirement has
been interpreted broadly and is not contingent upon physical proximity
or sight;75 the arrestor can become aware of the misdemeanor through his
other senses and external information.76  Some states, California in-
cluded, omit the phrase “breach of the peace” as a qualification to the
commission of misdemeanors77 and allow citizens to arrest for misde-
meanors committed or attempted.78  However, Arizona, Indiana, and
Mississippi specifically qualify the misdemeanor as one involving a
72 CAL. PEN. CODE § 837 (West 2015).
73 The statute provides:
A private person may arrest another:
1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
2. When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his
presence.
3. When a felony has been in fact committed, and he has reasonable cause for
believing the person arrested to have committed it.
Id.  States that replicate California’s law include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, and Utah. ALA. CODE § 15-10-7 (2015); ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.030 (2015); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3884 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-604 (2015); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35.33.1.4 (West 2015); IOWA CODE § 804.9 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2403 (2015);
MINN. STAT. § 629.37 (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 171.126 (West 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-20 (2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 202
(West 2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-3 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-109 (2015);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-3 (West 2015).
74 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 837(1); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-604; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 29-06-20.
75 See People v. Lee, 204 Cal. Rptr. 667, 669 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1984) (describing
the application of the presence requirement in California).
76 See People v. Bloom, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710, 714 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding a valid
citizen’s arrest of a person who incessantly called and harassed a 911 dispatcher).  While the
dispatcher never saw or witnessed the harasser place the phone calls, the misdemeanor offense
was still made in the dispatcher’s presence through the use of the telephone—”an electronic
device that aids a person’s auditory perception.” Id.
77 See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 837(1) (suggesting that a citizen can arrest for misde-
meanors that would not be characterized as breaches of the peace, since that phrase is pur-
posely omitted from the statute); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 202 (same); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-7-109 (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-3 (omitting “breach of peace” in defining when a
private citizen can arrest for misdemeanors).
78 CAL. PEN. CODE § 837(1); see also ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.030(a)(1) (allowing a citi-
zen to arrest for misdemeanors committed or attempted); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.126(1)
(same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-3(1) (same). But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3884(1) (2015) (limiting the ability for the citizen to arrest for misdemeanors to those actually
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breach of the peace.79  A judge or jury often determines whether a crime
was a completed or attempted felony, misdemeanor, breach of the peace,
or nothing at all long after the crime was committed.  Citizens effectuat-
ing an arrest for anything less than an obvious felony are therefore less
able to make calculated decisions and may face liability for false arrest.
All of the states that follow the California framework permit a citi-
zen to arrest for felonies not committed in his or her presence, but the
statutes differ when characterizing the reasonableness a citizen must
have in believing that the arrestee is guilty of the offense.80  In Califor-
nia, a citizen can arrest for a felony in two situations: (1) the arrestee
actually committed a felony, although not in the citizen’s presence;81 or
(2) a felony has been committed and the citizen has reasonable or proba-
ble cause to believe the person arrested committed it.82  California’s stat-
ute—like other similarly worded statutes—thus adopts a partial strict
liability approach to arrests for felonies.  Even if the person arrested did
not actually commit a felony, the citizen arrestor will not be liable for his
mistake if he or she can articulate reasonable or probable cause that the
arrestee was the perpetrator.83  Arkansas’ statute, on the other hand, is
much more favorable to arrestors; a citizen need only show that he or she
had “reasonable grounds for believing” that the arrestee committed a fel-
ony, but not that a felony was actually committed.84  Furthermore, rea-
committed); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-1-4(a)(3) (2015) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-109
(same).
79 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3884 (specifying that a citizen can arrest for a misde-
meanor “amount[ing] to a breach of peace”); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-1-4 (West 2015) (per-
mitting arrest for the commission of a misdemeanor “involving a breach of peace” in his
presence and “the arrest is necessary to prevent the continuance of the breach of peace”); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (2015) (“[A] private person may arrest any person without warrant
[for] . . . a breach of the peace threatened or attempted in his presence . . . .”); see also TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(a) (West 2015) (allowing arrest for an offense classified as
one “against the public peace”).
80 Compare CAL. PEN. CODE § 837(3) (stating that the citizen must have “reasonable
cause for believing the person arrested to have committed [the felony]”), and TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-7-109(a)(3) (same), with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2403(1) (requiring the citizen to
show that he or she had “probable cause” to believe that the arrestee committed the crime),
and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-3(2) (same).
81 CAL. PEN. CODE § 837(3); accord ALA. CODE § 15-10-7(a)(3) (2015) (stating that a
private person may arrest for a felony not committed in his presence, but only if the arrestee
committed it); see State v. Duren, 123 N.W.2d 624, 632 (Minn. 1963) (presuming that the
presence element, which is required for misdemeanor arrests, is not a prerequisite for felony
arrests because a felon at large presents a greater danger to the public).
82 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 837(3).
83 See id. (providing that a private person may arrest a suspect for a felony that has been
committed when he has reasonable cause to believe that the suspect committed it).
84 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-106(d) (2014); cf. State v. Johnson, 930 P.2d 1148, 1154
(N.M. 1996) (concluding that a citizen’s arrest is lawful when based upon “a good faith, rea-
sonable belief that a felony had been or was being committed based on the arrestee’s overt acts
or other trustworthy information”).  New Mexico follows the common law doctrine of citizen’s
arrest. See Downs v. Garay, 742 P.2d 533, 535 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that the common
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sonable cause is relatively easy to prove.85  By contrast, in New York, no
matter how reasonable the arrestor’s action may appear at the time of
arrest, if a felony was not actually committed, he will be liable for false
arrest.86  New York’s statute provides the strictest form of liability in
effectuating a citizen’s arrest, leaving no room for mistakes.
One commentator has suggested that strict liability for mistaken ar-
rests conflicts with the purpose of citizen’s arrest because citizens should
be encouraged to help the police in protecting the public and appre-
hending criminals.87  This perspective, however, largely ignores the dif-
ference between a police officer and a common citizen: an officer
receives training on how to safely arrest a criminal and ordinary citizens
do not.  While recruiting citizens to aid in eradicating crime is a noble
idea, the possibility for citizens to abuse the power suggests that a stan-
dard less stringent than strict liability is dangerous for arrestors and ar-
restees alike.
Some states choose to either specify the precise offenses for which a
private citizen can arrest or broadly authorize a citizen to arrest for any
crime.  In Maine, for example, a citizen can arrest the suspect if he or she
has probable cause to believe that the person committed murder or “any
Class A, Class B or Class C crime,” and for a Class D or Class E crime if
the offense is committed in the arrestor’s presence.88  Hawaii states that
“any person present” can arrest “anyone in the act of committing a
crime,”89 and the Attorney General determined that the term “crime”
should be interpreted “in its broadest sense.”90  Illinois and Montana both
restrict the general authorization to arrest for any offense.  In Illinois, a
law right for a citizen to arrest controls in New Mexico).  The Supreme Court of New Mexico
has explicitly rejected the adoption of a strict liability citizen’s arrest statute and instead sup-
ports a statute that fully protects the citizen in making the arrest. Johnson, 930 P.2d at 1154.
85 See Stutte v. State, 432 S.W.3d 661, 664 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014) (“Probable cause to
arrest is defined as ‘a reasonable ground for suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing that a crime has been committed
by the person suspected.’” (quoting Hilton v. State, 96 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Ark. Ct. App.
2003))).
86 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.30(1)(a) (McKinney 2015) (authorizing a private person
to arrest another for a felony when “the latter has in fact committed such felony”); see also
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(a) (West 2015) (requiring the felony to have been
committed in the citizen’s presence).
87 See Note, The Law of Citizen’s Arrest, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 502, 511 (1965) (“The rule
of absolute liability is inconsistent with the theory that citizen’s arrests are a desirable and
necessary adjunct to official law enforcement.”); id. (finding fault with holding citizen ar-
restors strictly liable for mistaken arrests because doing so will “seriously undermine the citi-
zen’s willingness to arrest”).
88 ME. STAT. tit. 17, § 16 (2015); see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-8-101 (2015) (retaining
the misdemeanor-felony distinction, but specifying the misdemeanors for which a citizen can
arrest as only theft offense or property destruction).
89 HAW. REV. STAT. § 803-3 (2015).
90 76 Haw. Op. Att’y Gen. 4 (1976).
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citizen cannot arrest for an ordinance violation,91 while Montana speci-
fies that a citizen can arrest when “the existing circumstances require the
person’s immediate arrest.”92  It would likely be difficult for an ordinary
citizen to lawfully comply with either the Maine or Illinois statute with-
out previously knowing the particular conduct that may qualify as an
“ordinance violation” in Illinois or a “Class A” crime in Maine.  Accord-
ingly, it would behoove a cautious citizen to research the state code and
corresponding citizen’s arrest statute thoroughly in the particular juris-
diction prior to testing his arrest powers.
II. CITIZENS BEWARE: THE MISAPPLICATION OF CITIZEN’S ARREST
As the law currently stands, a citizen can basically arrest anytime he
or she witnesses the commission of a felony or misdemeanor, depending
on the specific statute.  It is difficult to guide a common citizen on how
to make a correct and lawful citizen’s arrest when the states are unclear
on the limits of a citizen’s authority.  This confusion is magnified in
states that have retained the common law doctrine of citizen’s arrest in-
stead of codifying it.93  Many citizens do not comprehend the parameters
of their authority.  In a California case, a citizen testified that he did not
understand the legal definition of a citizen’s arrest and had no intention
of arresting the suspect, yet a court still concluded that he had performed
a valid citizen’s arrest.94
In addition to the confusion surrounding when citizens are permitted
to execute a valid arrest in a particular state, people are currently allowed
to roam the streets looking for wrongdoers to arrest, thus increasing the
potential for abuse.  Unlike police officers, private citizens are not re-
stricted to a certain jurisdiction within the state and have not been trained
extensively.95  Recent cases highlight the dangers of individuals taking
the law into their own hands, for both the arrestor and the arrestee.96
91 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-3 (2015).
92 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-502 (2015).
93 See supra Part I.B (describing the confusing labyrinth of citizen’s arrest rules in com-
mon law jurisdictions).
94 See Padilla v. Meese, 229 Cal. Rptr. 310, 311, 316 (Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that
the citizen’s “definitional misunderstanding” of the doctrine does not make the arrest unlaw-
ful).  The court dismissed the citizen’s subjective mindset at the time of the alleged arrest and
focused solely on his objective actions.  Since he had told the suspect to pull his car over and
wait until the police arrived, the court believed these acts demonstrated that he detained the
suspect even though he testified that he had no intention of arresting him. Id.
95 See Katherine Marsh, Playing Police, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July–Aug. 2004, at 16, 17
(“It’s not uncommon for people who make citizen’s arrests—some of whom seem to have only
reruns of Cops to draw upon for their knowledge of due process—to get in trouble for making
false or otherwise improper arrests.”).
96 See, e.g., State v. Lisko, No. 2013AP2132-CR, 2014 Wis. App. LEXIS 917, at *2
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2014) (detailing circumstances in which the private arrestor attacked
the arrestee); see also Katie Mettler, Man Shopping for Coffee Creamer at Walmart Attacked
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This confusion and risk of misuse presents an insurmountable barrier to a
clear and effective citizen’s arrest doctrine.  As to private citizens, there-
fore, jurisdictions should abolish the doctrine.  This abolition should also
apply to volunteer organizations, such as the Guardian Angels, that en-
courage and train private citizens to make citizen’s arrests.  The same
issues of confusion and risk of misuse apply to these organizations be-
cause there is no oversight or assurance that these individuals are prop-
erly trained to safely effectuate a citizen’s arrest.
A. Confusion in Making a Citizen’s Arrest
Whether a state uses the common law or a statute, and regardless of
the status of the arrestor, certain features of the citizen’s arrest doctrine
are essential in determining a lawful arrest.97  These core features include
the nature of the crime committed, whether probable cause for suspicion
exists, the temporal reasonableness of detention, and the appropriate use
of force on the part of the arrestor.98  These concepts are consistently the
subject of judicial concern, and violating any of them places an arrestor
at risk for claims of false imprisonment or unlawful detention.99
Private persons can encounter legal difficulties in jurisdictions that
require them to differentiate between a felony and a misdemeanor, with
the commission of a felony allowing for citizen’s arrest, while the com-
by Vigilante for Carrying Gun He Was Legally Permitted to Have, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan.
20, 2015, 7:45 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/man-shopping-for-coffee-
creamer-at-walmart-attacked-by-vigilante-for/2214432 (reporting a situation in which a person
was charged with battery after tackling a man who was legally carrying a firearm in a Walmart
store); Jesse Wells, Man Dies in Oklahoma City After Being Tied Up During Citizen’s Arrest,
NEWS CHANNEL 4 (May 28, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://kfor.com/2015/05/28/oklahoma-city-po-
lice-investigating-after-man-dies-in-their-custody; infra Part II.B (describing additional abuses
of citizen’s arrest).
97 See generally The Law of Citizen’s Arrest, supra note 87 (providing a comprehensive R
overview of the citizen’s arrest doctrine and recognizing the underlying basic concepts re-
quired to lawfully effectuate an arrest).
98 See id. at 507–10 (explaining these principles in depth while also examining the im-
portance of other factors, such as the arrestor’s physical observation of the criminal act and
liability arising from an arrestor’s mistake).  A critical concept underlying the citizen’s arrest
doctrine is urgency as it relates to public safety; any comprehensive citizen’s arrest statute
should recognize that the most pressing concern of the doctrine is to prevent present dangers
rather than to redress past wrongs. Id. at 513.  Some argue that while a private person should
defer to the police where it is practical to do so, he or she should also be allowed to perform an
arrest where delay would allow the perpetrator to escape. Id.
99 See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. v. Lovett, 525 S.E.2d 751, 754 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (holding
that conducting a citizen’s arrest was unreasonable where the arrestor admitted she did not
actually suspect the arrestee of shoplifting); State v. Adams, 738 P.2d 988, 990 (Or. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that further detention of a suspect after initial investigation for an hour before
contacting the sheriff was unreasonable); Giant Food, Inc. v. Scherry, 444 A.2d 483, 488 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (holding that use of deadly force is allowed when effectuating a citizen’s
arrest, but firing bullets at a fleeing suspect in an area where innocent bystanders could be
injured was unreasonable).
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mission of a misdemeanor does not.100  Such a discrepancy illustrates
one of the problems inherent in the citizen’s arrest doctrine in these juris-
dictions—individuals are often placed in a tenuous position when forced
to decide in real time whether they are witnessing a felony or a misde-
meanor.101  In these jurisdictions, the arrestor essentially acts at his peril
when arresting for a crime that approaches the often nebulous line be-
tween the two levels of misconduct.
When the underlying crime is of a serious nature that a reasonable
person could believe constituted a felony, requiring an arrestor to under-
stand which crimes are felonies and which are misdemeanors compounds
the risk assumed by the arrestor.102  Driving while intoxicated, for exam-
ple, is most commonly categorized as a misdemeanor or a breach of
peace, preventing a citizen from arresting an intoxicated driver in a juris-
diction that only allows citizen’s arrests for felonies.103  This categoriza-
tion is counterintuitive, because of the serious nature of intoxicated
driving.104  At the same time, encouraging confrontation with intoxicated
drivers can lead to unsafe situations for everyone involved.  Moreover,
requiring an arrestor to know not only the intricacies of the felony/misde-
meanor divide in the jurisdiction, but also having to know which crimes
justify a citizen’s arrest, can create immensely difficult terrain for an
arrestor to navigate.105  Some jurisdictions present an additional issue by
100 See, e.g., Jackson v. Gossard, 549 N.E.2d 1234, 1236 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that a citizen’s arrest for a misdemeanor was unlawful within the jurisdiction, thereby allowing
the arrestee to use force equal to that of the arrestor in resisting the arrest).
101 See id. at 1235–36 (noting the bright-line rule allowing for citizen’s arrest for a felony
and not for a misdemeanor, but maintaining that the arrestor had no reason to believe that the
arrestee’s conduct—damaging the arrestor’s automobile—rose to the level of a felony).
102 See Anelli Xavier, Misdemeanor vs. Felony, DUI FOUND., http://www.duifoundation.
org/legalguide/finespenalties/misdemeanorvsfelony (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (explaining that
although laws vary by jurisdiction, a DUI or DWI generally is considered a misdemeanor
unless it is the perpetrator’s third or fourth offense or if the driver causes an accident or
damage to persons or property).
103 See, e.g., State v. Houlton, 416 N.W.2d 588, 589 (Neb. 1987) (holding that an arrestor
could arrest only for a felony or petit larceny, meaning that an off-duty police officer could not
arrest a citizen whom he reasonably believed was driving while intoxicated).  The citizen’s
alcohol blood content was nearly four times the legal limit, but driving while intoxicated is a
misdemeanor in Nebraska and thus not a crime for which a citizen’s arrest could lawfully be
effectuated. Id.  The arrest was upheld, however, because the arrestor provided probable cause
to police to investigate. Id. at 590. But see City of Waukesha v. Gorz, 479 N.W.2d 221, 223
(Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing a citizen’s arrest for driving while intoxicated because it is a
dangerous act with high possibility of violence, while recognizing that driving while intoxi-
cated is a breach of peace and not a felony).
104 Justin Worland, Why Police Aren’t Catching Drunk Drivers, TIME (Dec. 31, 2014),
http://time.com/3650196/police-drunk-driving (explaining that police officers have struggled
with enforcing laws against intoxicated driving).
105 See Xavier, supra note 102 (highlighting the varying iterations of laws that surround R
driving while intoxicated, implying that it would be extremely difficult for the average citizen
to know when such a crime would constitute a misdemeanor or a felony).
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allowing citizen’s arrest for a breach of peace, but not for other misde-
meanors, thereby requiring citizens to further comprehend the nuances of
these types of offenses.106
Illustrating this dilemma, a Texas appellate court embarked on an
in-depth analysis to determine whether driving while intoxicated
amounted to a breach of peace, which would allow for a legal citizen’s
arrest in Texas.107  The court concluded that there are different degrees
of erratic driving, the categorization of which determines whether partic-
ular conduct constitutes a breach of peace or a mere moving violation.108
The court was split on whether a driver who crossed the dividing line on
a road about twenty times in a quarter mile and repeatedly bumped the
curb with her tires committed a breach of peace.109  The majority held
that the conduct was dangerous enough to qualify as erratic driving,110
while the dissent concluded that the driver did not endanger the pub-
lic.111  The failure of the court to establish the driver’s actions unambigu-
ously as a breach of peace portends that private citizens will be in a
precarious position when deciding whether to effectuate a citizen’s arrest
in similar circumstances.
In addition to distinguishing between a felony and a misdemeanor, a
private arrestor must generally have probable cause to effectuate a lawful
arrest,112 and a lack of probable cause is a basis for a wrongful arrest
claim.113  Similarly, the arrestor often bears the burden of correctness in
his or her probable cause assertion, and a mistake-of-fact defense does
not absolve the arrestor of liability.114  While these restrictions on ar-
106 See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(a) (West 2015) (allowing a lawful
citizen’s arrest only “if the offense is classed as a felony or as an offense against the public
peace”).
107 See Kunkel v. State, 46 S.W.3d 328, 330–32 (Tex. App. 2001) (“What constitutes a
breach of the peace is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, looking to the facts and
circumstances surrounding the act.”).
108 Id. at 331.
109 Id.
110 Id. (concluding that the citizen’s arrest was properly carried out); see also Miles v.
State, 241 S.W.2d 28, 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (concluding that a truck driver’s arrest of a
drunk driver was proper because the drunk driver “posed an ongoing threat of violence or
harm to . . . others”).
111 Kunkel, 46 S.W.3d at 332 (Hutson-Dunn, J., dissenting).
112 See, e.g., Mason v. Sullivan, 266 F. App’x 609, 610 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a
college official had probable cause to make a citizen’s arrest against anti-abortion protesters
based on the college’s campus permit policy); State v. Schubert, 244 P.3d 748, 753 (Mont.
2010) (concluding that a private citizen had probable cause to arrest a drunk driver because she
observed the “vehicle being operated dangerously and with clear manifestations of an impaired
driver”).
113 See K-Mart Corp. v. Lovett, 525 S.E.2d 751, 754 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a
citizen’s arrest without probable cause is unreasonable and unlawful).
114 See United States v. Hillsman, 522 F.2d 454, 460–61 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that
the principal difference between an arrest conducted by a private citizen and one conducted by
a police officer is that the former must turn out to be correct in the assumption that a crime has
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restors vary by jurisdiction, the overarching message is that the arrestor
must reasonably believe that the arrestee has committed a crime before a
citizen’s arrest is valid.115  While the probable cause standard can act as
a safeguard for arrestees, having ordinary citizens traverse the confusing
concept of probable cause places them in a problematic position, espe-
cially if they have limited legal knowledge.
Even if a crime is readily recognizable as one that allows for a law-
ful citizen’s arrest in that jurisdiction and the arrestor has probable cause,
citizen arrestors face other hurdles in avoiding liability for wrongful de-
tention.  One such impediment is temporal reasonableness, whereby an
arrestor cannot detain an arrestee beyond what courts determine to be an
acceptable amount of time.116  Factors in determining such reasonable-
ness include the length of time required to perform an adequate investi-
gation of the suspect’s guilt, the cooperation of the suspect in that
inquiry, and the amount of time taken to contact the police.117  To avoid
an unlawful detention claim, for instance, the arrestor must expedite the
investigative process where possible to limit the amount of time that the
suspect is detained.118  A person performing a citizen’s arrest must also
know what courts in his or her jurisdiction have determined to be a rea-
sonable detention period for the arrestee.119  The fact that courts make
this determination on a case-by-case basis increases the difficulty for pri-
vate citizens to know what constitutes a reasonable amount of time.120
These alone are significant restrictions on an arrestor, but he or she
must also anticipate using force when making a citizen’s arrest.  In gen-
eral, an arrestor may use as much force as is reasonably required to de-
been committed, whereas the latter is forgiven for reasonable mistakes of fact).  The defend-
ants in Hillsman could reasonably have assumed that a felony had been committed, but be-
cause arrestors act at their own peril and because no felony had in fact been committed, their
reasonable belief did not absolve them of guilt. Id.
115 See, e.g., The Law of Citizen’s Arrest, supra note 87, at 510–12 (discussing how dif- R
ferent jurisdictions handle this restriction and debating the costs and benefits of a strict liability
standard for mistakes of fact).
116 See, e.g., State v. Adams, 738 P.2d 988, 990 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that reasona-
bleness is determined under a totality of the circumstances test, pursuant to which, in the
instant case, the length of the detention was unreasonable).
117 See id. (holding that one hour to contact the sheriff was unreasonable); State v. Miller,
698 P.2d 554, 556 n.1 (Wash. 1985) (stating that a person may be held only as long as required
for a peace officer, merchant, or other agent to conduct an investigation, including time neces-
sary for the alleged shoplifter to either make a statement or refuse to make a statement pertain-
ing to his or her alleged guilt).
118 See Adams, 738 P.2d at 990 (explaining the totality of the circumstances test in con-
junction with a one-hour detainment).
119 See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text. R
120 See, e.g., Adams, 738 P.2d at 990.
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tain the arrestee and effectuate the arrest.121  How much force is
reasonably required is, of course, subject to much debate and is tradition-
ally viewed under a totality-of-the-circumstances test.122  This test puts
an arrestor on uncertain footing when attempting to detain a suspect, be-
cause the arrestor knows that his or her conduct will be examined after
the fact for reasonableness, which could result in the arrestee taking legal
action against the arrestor.123  The amount of force required to detain the
arrestee—including deadly force—must be weighed against the risk
posed to the public in using that force or by allowing the arrestee to
escape.124
The potential for legal action against the arrestor is a common
theme through all the grey areas of the citizen’s arrest doctrine, whether
in terms of the felony/misdemeanor dichotomy, the probable cause re-
quirement, the temporal reasonableness standard, or the use of force.
The consequence is that the doctrine is tremendously difficult for the
average citizen to comprehend and to apply.  Nearly every jurisdiction in
the United States treats the doctrine differently, and most jurisdictions
handle it in complicated ways.  While law enforcement officers operating
outside their jurisdiction and private police officers have some training to
guide them through this underbrush, the average citizen generally does
not.  If this thicket is not proof enough that the ill-defined nature of the
citizen’s arrest doctrine will continue to be problematic in its current
form, severe abuses of the doctrine lend additional support.
B. Abuses of Citizen’s Arrest
Some police officers attempt to use the citizen’s arrest doctrine as a
blanket authorization to arrest anyone for almost anything and eliminate
121 See The Law of Citizen’s Arrest, supra note 87, at 508–09 (reviewing the general R
standards for use of force while recognizing that use of deadly force requires a far less deferen-
tial examination).
122 See Nelson v. Howell, 455 So. 2d 608, 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (acknowledging
that the arrestor has the right to use as much force as necessary to detain a suspect, but main-
taining that the reasonableness of the use of deadly force is a question to be determined by a
jury based on the facts of the case).
123 See, e.g., Murray Weiss, Retired Corrections Officer Shooting Puts Spotlight on Citi-
zen’s Arrest Law, DNAINFO (Mar. 13, 2015, 12:27 PM), http://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/
20150313/downtown-brooklyn/retired-corrections-officer-shooting-puts-spotlight-on-citizens-
arrest-law (noting that the citizen’s arrest law in New York sets a high bar for the use of deadly
force, requiring an arrestor to retreat when fearing for his or her safety and to use deadly force
only when faced with deadly force).  The lawful use of deadly force to effectuate a citizen’s
arrest is extremely limited and requires that an objective, reasonable person would fear for his
or her safety, rather than the lower standard of a subjective fear that had previously been
required. Id.
124 See Giant Food, Inc. v. Scherry, 444 A.2d 483, 486–87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982)
(formulating a reasonableness standard for when the use of deadly force may be appropriate,
while recognizing that great caution should be exercised in instances in which innocent third-
party bystanders may be put at risk by the arrestor’s conduct).
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the usual restraints that are placed on an officer’s arrest power, such as
arresting an individual without actually witnessing the incident.  In one
instance, an officer had a private citizen sign a blank citizen’s arrest form
as a precautionary measure to permit the officers to arrest protestors if
they became rowdy.125  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
declared the use of the blank citizen’s arrest form to be invalid “because
the citizen who signed the form did not see [the defendant] describe her
alleged offense, or point her out to the police.”126  After concluding that
the defendant was not arrested pursuant to a valid citizen’s arrest, the
arresting officers had the burden to prove that they had probable cause to
arrest the defendant, which they ultimately could not show.127
In a similar case in Minnesota, police officers argued that an arrest
was valid based on the power of citizen’s arrest, rather than pursuant to
their official authority.  The defendant was arrested for driving under the
influence after he crashed his car into the citizen arrestor’s parked car.128
The arrestor never had any contact with the defendant other than the
initial crash and testified that she did not see the defendant driving.129
The officers who arrived at the scene concluded that the defendant was
drunk and told the arrestor to sign the citizen’s arrest form.130  The ar-
restor signed the form after the officers explained that they did not have
the power to arrest since the offense was not committed in their pres-
ence.131  The court held that the citizen’s arrest was invalid because the
arresting citizen was not aware that the defendant was intoxicated at the
time of the incident or the arrest.132  Police officers should not be permit-
ted to rely upon a private citizen’s arresting power when their own au-
thority is lacking.
Similar to police officers unlawfully expanding their arrest author-
ity, some private arrestors improperly extend the power of citizen’s arrest
to detain a suspect in order to obtain a confession.  One arrestor detained
125 Dubner v. City of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 962 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the
blank citizen’s arrest form provided spaces for the police officers to write in the name of the
offender and the offense).
126 Id. at 964.
127 Id. at 965–66 (concluding that the officers did not testify to seeing the defendant at the
demonstration or observe the defendant violating any laws).
128 State v. Duren, 123 N.W.2d 624, 626 (Minn. 1963).
129 Id. at 627 (indicating that the arrestor testified that she never talked to the defendant
throughout the entire night).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 628 (noting that the officers explained to the private citizen that “she would have
to be the one that would make the arrest”).  The arrestor testified that she did not “have [any]
opinion one way or the other as to whether the defendant was intoxicated or not.” Id.
132 Id. at 632.  According to Minnesota’s citizen’s arrest statute, the citizen can arrest only
for misdemeanors committed in the person’s presence. Id. at 630–31.  Second-hand knowl-
edge of an offense does not meet the in-person requirement, but sensory perception does. Id.
at 631–32.
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the suspect, bound him, hung him from his feet, and struck him while he
was questioned about items missing from a shop.133  Prosecutors charged
the defendant-arrestors with false imprisonment, among other things.134
In response to this charge, the defendants attempted to use citizen’s arrest
as an affirmative defense.135  This defense failed; the court concluded
that the defendants had detained the suspect in order to “bludgeon a con-
fession out of him or administer his version of vigilante justice.”136  In a
similar case, a private arrestor attacked the suspect by punching him,
hanging him upside down by his ankles, and commanding his dog to
repeatedly attack and bite him as a ploy to get a confession.137  The ar-
restor explained that he tied up the suspect “so he would not run away
and [so he could] get to the bottom of the recent spate of thefts.”138  In
response to a charge of false imprisonment, the private arrestor argued,
unsuccessfully, that he believed the suspect had burglarized his home
and, therefore, that he was permitted to detain him as part of a valid
citizen’s arrest.139  While both private arrestors failed in using citizen’s
arrest to justify their behavior, the fact that they used the doctrine as a
tool of vigilantism highlights its dangers.
In addition to using citizen’s arrest as a vigilantism tool, a private
arrestor successfully used the doctrine to escape a first-degree murder
conviction.  In People v. Whitty,140 the decedent had robbed the defen-
dant’s store, and the defendant told the police that if he found the perpe-
trator before the police, he would kill him.141  The defendant found the
robber and attempted to detain him, but he resisted.142  During this alter-
cation, the defendant shot and killed the perpetrator.143  The Michigan
appellate court overturned and remanded the defendant’s murder convic-
tion because the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the ability
of a private citizen to use force to stop a fleeing felon.144  Although other
states prohibit the use of deadly force by private citizens,145 Michigan
retained the common law doctrine because police “cannot be everywhere
133 McPetrie v. State, 587 S.E.2d 233, 236 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
134 Id.  The other charges were kidnapping, aggravated assault, and battery. Id.
135 Id. at 237.
136 Id.
137 State v. Lisko, No. 2013AP2132-CR, 2014 Wis. App. LEXIS 917, at *2 (Ct. App.
Nov. 5, 2014).
138 Id.
139 Id. at *2–3.
140 292 N.W.2d 214 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
141 Id. at 216–17.
142 Id. at 217.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 218–19.
145 See, e.g., State v. Weddell, 43 P.3d 987, 991 (Nev. 2002) (indicating that the Nevada
Legislature abolished the common law rule allowing a private citizen to use deadly force
against a fleeing felon).
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that they are needed at once” and sometimes deadly force is required to
detain a fleeing felon.146  For a defendant to be acquitted, he or she must
show that his use of deadly force was necessary either in self-defense or
to prevent the perpetrator’s escape.147  Since private citizens do not typi-
cally have the same training as police officers, the Whitty case exposes
the deadly dangers of giving private citizens the authority to act like po-
lice officers.  Moreover, absolving a man who had expressed his intent to
kill another demonstrates the concern with extending the use of deadly
force within the citizen’s arrest doctrine.148  Ultimately, these cases
demonstrate the potential for serious abuse that comes with the power of
citizen’s arrest, particularly in the hands of private citizens.
C. Neighborhood Watch Groups
Volunteer watch groups present an additional problem within the
realm of citizen’s arrest.  The Guardian Angels, an organization that be-
gan in New York City, is an example of a prominent private citizen’s
volunteer watch group.  The volunteer organization was founded in 1979
to patrol the New York City subway system.149  The Guardian Angels
focus on deterring crime, reporting violations, and making citizen’s ar-
rests when necessary.150  The group’s prevalence is due in large part to
the relationships it formed with local governmental entities.  Mayor Ed
Koch at first refused to recognize the group, calling them vigilantes.151
In 1981, however, Curtis Sliwa, founder of the Guardian Angels, and
Robert G.M. Keating, coordinator of criminal justice for Mayor Koch,
announced a memorandum of understanding among the Angels, the Po-
lice Department, and the Metropolitan Transit Authority, pursuant to
which they vowed to “work together cooperatively.”152  The Angels
146 Whitty, 292 N.W.2d at 220 (“Elimination or severe curtailment of the citizen’s justifia-
ble use of deadly force would ignore the practical limitations on the ability of law enforcement
authorities to arrest every felon.”).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 216–18 (noting that, while the defendant denied that he planned to kill the dece-
dent, the defendant told police officers that he would have killed him).
149 See Mission, GUARDIAN ANGELS, http://www.guardianangels.org/about/mission (last
visited Jan. 21, 2016) (setting forth the group’s mission statement).  The original members
rode the subway between the “toughest stops,” unarmed, in order to “find the gang members
who had been mugging the straphangers in the subway and detain them for the police to
arrest.” Id. But see Dennis Jay Kenney, Crime on the Subways: Measuring the Effectiveness
of the Guardian Angels, 3 JUST. Q. 481, 482 (1986) (“Despite these claims [of a sense of
security and crime reduction], many critics of active citizen action have pointed out that histor-
ically these groups have a tendency to degenerate into socially destructive forces.”).
150 See William Robbins, Effectiveness of Guardian Angels Called Uncertain, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 7, 1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/08/07/us/effectiveness-of-guardian-angels-
called-uncertain.html.
151 See id.
152 The City; Guardian Angels Get City Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 1981), http://
www.nytimes.com/1981/05/30/nyregion/the-city-guardian-angels-get-city-recognition.html
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agreed to register with the Police Department and to wear identification
cards issued by the Department.153  This agreement provided some legiti-
macy to the group by showing that the Guardian Angels were loosely
connected with the police.154
At the same time, an agreement to share information does not guar-
antee adequate oversight of a private organization.  Police officers have
expressed their skepticism and concern about the ability of Guardian An-
gels to effectively intervene in dangerous situations without harming
themselves or other citizens.155  While the Guardian Angels have pub-
lished training manuals on the subject of citizen’s arrest and the use of
force surrounding an arrest, their guidelines are overly general and have
the potential to be misapplied by members.156 The Guardian Angels Use
of Force Training Manual: Arrest Force indicates that force should only
be used when necessary, but it provides numerous detailed explanations
of tactics to overcome an individual with force.157 With no guarantee that
Guardian Angels members are properly trained, this lack of transparency
can lead to tragic results.158  Moreover, the Official Guardian Angels
Training Book provides its members only with excerpts from the Nevada
citizen’s arrest statute, which leaves members in other states guessing as
to the legality of their actions in performing a citizen’s arrest.159 In Illi-
(reporting that the police and the Guardian Angels agreed to share information and remain in
contact with each other); see also Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons,
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 100 (2011) (describing the memorandum as “an important stabi-
lizing mechanism for the group and arguably lent considerable legitimacy to their activities,
even as those activities were deemed controversial”); Robbins, supra note 150 (“[Under the R
agreement,] Mr. Sliwa . . . provided the police with a list of 569 of his members for the
department’s records, as well as for a check into any possible criminal past.  In return, the
department [agreed to] issue identification cards bearing photographs that the Angels [had to]
wear on patrol.”).
153 The City; Guardian Angels Get City Recognition, supra note 152. R
154 New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani later fully supported the group by including
the Guardian Angels in his law and order campaign. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Giuliani’s
Angel Posse, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Dec. 28, 2007, 6:13 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/
2007/12/28/giulianis-angel-posse (reporting on the small group of Guardian Angels that
showed up at forum for Mayor Giuliani in Fort Dodge, Iowa).
155 Susan Pennell et al., Guardian Angels: A Unique Approach to Crime Prevention, 35
CRIME & DELINQ. 378, 389–90 (1989).
156 See GUARDIAN ANGELS, USE OF FORCE TRAINING MANUAL 2 (2004) (“Arrest Force is
only to be used when arresting someone for committing a crime (a misdemeanor crime in your
presence or a felony crime with reasonable suspicion).”).  This statement is inaccurate because
not every state allows citizen’s arrest for misdemeanors. See supra Part I.B–C.
157 GUARDIAN ANGELS, supra note 156, at 2–52. R
158 See, e.g., 4 Guardian Angels Stabbed While Intervening in Armed Robbery on CTA
Red Line, HUFFINGTON POST (May 16, 2012, 9:53 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
05/16/4-guardian-angels-stabbed_n_1520767.html (describing an incident in which four
Guardian Angels were stabbed while attempting to intervene during an armed robbery).
159 INT’L ALLIANCE OF GUARDIAN ANGELS, THE OFFICIAL GUARDIAN ANGELS TRAINING
BOOK: PATROL MANUAL 11 (2004) (failing to mention that different states have different ap-
proaches to citizen’s arrest).
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nois, for example, a Guardian Angel was arrested for battery while at-
tempting to execute a citizen’s arrest to clear the area of gang
members.160
While the Guardian Angels provide a prevalent example of a private
citizen’s volunteer watch group, lack of training and potential for abuse
are common concerns among these types of organizations.161  In many
situations, these groups are functioning as police officers without the req-
uisite training that police receive.  George Zimmerman is a contemporary
example of a neighborhood watch group member taking the law into his
own hands.162  Despite instructions from a police dispatcher to refrain
from following Trayvon Martin, he continued to pursue the unarmed
teenager, eventually killing Martin.  A jury acquitted Zimmerman of sec-
ond-degree murder and the lesser included crime of manslaughter.163
Citizen patrol groups on the U.S.-Mexico border have also abused the
power of citizen’s arrest.164  These groups have been the subject of litiga-
tion and unsuccessfully tried to justify their actions via the doctrine of
citizen’s arrest.165  The foregoing examples demonstrate the potential
160 Desiree Chen, Guardian Angels End Rogers Park Patrols After Police Run-in, CHI.
TRIB. (July 24, 1991), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1991-07-24/news/9103220271_1_
guardian-angels-angels-role-citizen-s-arrest (noting that Illinois allows a citizen’s arrest only
for a felony).
161 Sharon Finegan, Watching the Watchers: The Growing Privatization of Criminal Law
Enforcement and the Need for Limits on Neighborhood Watch Associations, 8 U. MASS. L.
REV. 88, 105 (2013) (“Despite their prevalence and popularity, [neighborhood watch pro-
grams] are rife with challenges.  Lack of training, poor organization, tendencies to target cer-
tain demographic groups, and overzealous interactions with suspects are common complaints
regarding neighborhood watch programs.”).  “Often, vigilantes lack police training, but are
attempting to perform essentially a policing function.  Vigilantes also have a personal stake in
the problem, rather than the dispassionate professionalism that we would hope for in police.”
Robinson, supra note 20, at 426. R
162 Finegan, supra note 161, at 119–20.  General tenets of neighborhood watch groups R
advise against pursuing suspicious persons and advocate contacting law enforcement. See
Michael Muskal & Tina Susman, Rules for Neighborhood Watch Discussed in George Zim-
merman Trial, L.A. TIMES (June 25, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/25/nation/la-
na-nn-george-zimmerman-neighborhood-watch-20130625.
163 Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing,
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmerman-ver
dict-trayvon-martin.html.
164 See Peter Yoxall, The Minuteman Project, Gone in a Minute or Here to Stay?  The
Origin, History and Future of Citizen Activism on the United States-Mexico Border, 37 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 517, 519 (2006) (explaining that while citizen border patrols ful-
filled a societal need and “acted within the legal framework of a citizen’s arrest,” they were
often “motivated by racist, xenophobic agendas, and often used violent and abusive tactics that
were beyond any permissible self-help privileges”).
165 Brooke H. Russ, Secrets on the Texas-Mexico Border: Leiva et al. v. Ranch Rescue
and Rodriguez et al. v. Ranch Rescue and the Right of Undocumented Aliens to Bring Suit, 35
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 405, 410–12 (2004) (describing the facts of two cases for assault
and false imprisonment where a citizen’s border patrol group attempted to rely on the affirma-
tive defense of citizen’s arrest).
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abuses that stem from affording groups of private citizens the ability to
make a citizen’s arrest.
If the goal of citizen patrol or neighborhood watch groups is to pre-
vent and deter crime, these goals can still be achieved without the doc-
trine of citizen’s arrest.  A study conducted on the Guardian Angels,
which covered 672 patrols, indicated that, “during a six-month period,
only two citizen arrests were recorded.”166  This figure signifies the mi-
nor role that citizen’s arrest plays in the activities of the Guardian An-
gels.  Even without the power of citizen’s arrest, these groups can
function in the same capacity as before.167 With target patrols, members
of the Angels and similar organizations can still act as a powerful deter-
rent.168  Other groups and government programs provide additional
mechanisms to report suspicious activity without necessitating direct in-
tervention in a given situation.169  Moreover, the prevalent use of cell
phones and other technology allow private individuals to record evidence
and report it to the police with very little interaction or involvement.170
Further, ordinary citizens still retain other legal tools that allow
them to intervene in certain circumstances.  In particular, the doctrines of
166 Pennell et al., supra note 155, at 387. R
167 Dana Hedgpeth, DC Guardian Angels Group Says It Will Patrol Metro More This
Weekend After Attacks, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-
gridlock/wp/2016/01/08/dc-guardian-angels-group-says-it-will-patrol-metro-more-this-week-
end-after-attacks (illustrating that the Guardian Angels can still patrol areas without the ability
to effectuate an arrest).
168 See, e.g., Lisa Finn, Guardian Angels Patrol Greenport, Say Latino Store Owners
Threatened If They Don’t Pay Gangs, SOUTHOLD LOCAL (Mar. 12, 2015, 8:23 AM), http://
southoldlocal.com/2015/03/12/guardian-angels-patrol-greenport-say-latino-store-owners-
threatened-if-they-dont-pay-gangs (“Businesses that have seen Guardian Angels presence say
they no longer have gang members hanging around, intimidating employees or issuing
threats.”); see also Chris Lisinski, Have the Guardian Angels Made a Difference in Green-
port?, SUFFOLK TIMES (July 30, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://suffolktimes.timesreview.com/2015/
07/60975/have-the-guardian-angels-made-a-difference-in-greenport (reporting on the pros and
cons of having the Guardian Angels in the community). But see Nikki Usher, Guardian An-
gels Return to L.A. Streets, L.A. TIMES (July 26, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jul/26/
local/me-angels26/2 (indicating that Guardian Angels patrols are less valuable in a sprawling
city like Los Angeles because there is less of a police presence to provide additional support).
169 See, e.g., About Citizen Corps, CITIZEN CORPS, http://www.ready.gov/about-citizen-
corps (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (establishing a network for communities to strengthen public
safety and crime prevention); About Neighborhood Watch, NAT’L NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH,
http://www.nnw.org/about-neighborhood-watch (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (encouraging citi-
zens to be an extra set of “eyes and ears” for law enforcement in reporting suspicious activity);
National Strategy, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.amberalert.gov/ntl_strategy.htm (last
visited Jan. 21, 2016) (encouraging community involvement to help locate missing children).
170 Most of the media coverage has focused on the recording of police interactions with
private citizens. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo & Mike Isaac, Phone Cameras and Apps Help
Speed Calls for Police Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/
09/technology/phone-cameras-and-apps-help-speed-calls-for-police-reform.html.  Neverthe-
less, this technology can also be used to help in police investigations.
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self-defense,171 defense of others,172 and defense of property173 all per-
mit citizens to legally protect themselves and others.  These defenses
generally allow an individual to intervene and use proportional force.174
The difference between these protective doctrines and the power of citi-
zen’s arrest is that citizen’s arrest gives private citizens the power to
detain a suspect.  This additional power alone necessitates a determina-
tion of what kind of crime was committed, whether probable cause ex-
isted to detain the suspect, whether the suspect was detained for a
reasonable amount of time, and whether the arrestor used reasonable
force, further complicating the doctrine of citizen’s arrest.  The doctrines
of self-defense, defense of others, and defense of property allow individ-
uals to protect themselves or others without the additional confusion and
legal nuances of detaining a suspect within the parameters of citizen’s
arrest. Ultimately, private citizens, alone or together, do not need the
doctrine of citizen’s arrest to keep their communities safe.
III. GOOD APPLICATIONS OF CITIZEN’S ARREST
A private citizen’s ability to arrest another inherently creates legally
tenuous confrontations.  However, certain forms of citizen’s arrest are
less controversial than others, reflecting a communal understanding that
some exercises of the doctrine are safer and more appropriate.  These
specific variations of citizen’s arrest function to further societal goals
with minimal risk of abuse.
A. Shopkeeper’s Privilege
One beneficial form of citizen’s arrest is commonly referred to as
the shopkeeper’s privilege, which allows a retail merchant to detain sus-
pected shoplifters until their guilt can be definitively ascertained.175
171 See generally 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 132 (2014) (allowing
the use of force as self-defense generally when three conditions are present: the initial aggres-
sor must have used unlawful force against the individual, the responding force must be neces-
sary, and the responding force must be reasonable and proportionate under the circumstances).
172 See generally id. § 133 (allowing the use of force to defend another generally when
three conditions are present: the initial aggressor must have used unlawful force against an-
other person, the responding force must be necessary to protect that person, and the responding
force must be reasonable and proportionate under the circumstances).
173 See generally id. § 134 (allowing the use of force to defend property generally when
three conditions are present: the initial aggressor must have used unlawful force threatening
one’s property, the responding force must be necessary to protect that property, and the re-
sponding force must be reasonable and proportionate under the circumstances).
174 See supra notes 171–73 (highlighting the similarities among the three defenses, in- R
cluding that each allows a reasonable and proportional force in response to unlawful force by
an initial aggressor).
175 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-10-14(a) (2015) (“[A] merchant or merchant’s employee
who has probable cause that goods . . . have been unlawfully taken . . . may . . . take the person
into custody and detain him in a reasonable manner.”); IND. CODE § 35-33-6-2(a)(1)(A) (2015)
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Shopkeeper’s privilege statutes arose as a result of a dilemma faced by
merchants: whether to absorb the loss by turning a blind eye to a sus-
pected shoplifter or to apprehend the suspect, risking a lawsuit if the
shopkeeper’s reasonable beliefs turn out to be erroneous or cannot be
proven in court.176  Similar to the citizen’s arrest doctrine as a whole, the
shopkeeper’s privilege is recognized by courts in some jurisdictions and
codified in others.177  Several general precepts of the shopkeeper’s privi-
lege are widely followed and accepted as appropriate uses of citizen’s
arrest power. These precepts, which are similar to those to which private
citizens are subject, are the level of suspicion, the amount of time a sus-
pect is detained, and the manner in which the suspect is detained.178
The first tenet guiding shopkeepers is the level of suspicion required
before detaining a suspect.  Under both the common law and most statu-
tory provisions, a shopkeeper’s reasonable grounds for detaining a sus-
pect tracks closely with the standard notion of probable cause.179
Probable cause generally entails a good faith belief or reasonable
grounds to believe that a suspect has attempted or committed shoplifting
(“[A]n owner or agent of a store who has probable cause to believe that a theft has oc-
curred . . . and who has cause to believe that a specific person has committed or is committing
the theft may detain the person and request the person to identify himself or herself.”); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-41-21(b) (2015) (“Any merchant who observes any person concealing or
attempting to conceal merchandise on his person . . . may detain the person for a reasonable
time sufficient to summon a police officer to the premises.”).
176 See generally Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Construction and Effect, in False Im-
prisonment Action, of Statute Providing for Detention of Suspected Shoplifters, 47 A.L.R. 3d
998 (1973 & Supp. 2012) (providing an overview of shopkeeper’s privilege statutes).
177 See, e.g., State v. Santiago, 217 P.3d 89, 98 (N.M. 2009) (recognizing the existence of
a common law shopkeeper’s privilege); State v. Garcia, 193 P.3d 181, 184–85 (Wash. Ct. App.
2008) (asserting the common law shopkeeper’s privilege even in a state that has also codified
the doctrine, illustrating how the shopkeeper’s privilege is one area in which common law and
codification approaches are often indistinguishable).
178 See supra note 175 (highlighting selected statutory provisions addressing the shop- R
keeper’s privilege).
179 See ALA. CODE § 15-10-14(a) (“[A] merchant or merchant’s employee who has proba-
ble cause . . . .”); IND. CODE § 35-33-6-2(a)(1)(A) (“An owner or agent of a store who has
probable cause . . . .”); Sauceda v. United States, No. CV-07-2267-PHX-DGC, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 103363, at *10–11 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2009) (noting that, in Arizona, the reasonable
grounds required under the shopkeeper’s privilege mirror the probable cause required for a
private person to make a citizen’s arrest). But see Henry v. J.C. Penney Co., No. 01-99-00739-
CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 2461, at *14 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2000) (stating that the reasona-
ble cause standard for an investigative detention requires something less than probable cause).
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or theft.180  Probable cause for detention is usually determined on a case-
by-case basis181 and can take on creative forms.182
The reasonable grounds standard is more deferential to shopkeepers
than it is in normal instances of citizen’s arrest due to the narrow, con-
trolled nature of the relationship between a shopkeeper and a customer.
The shopkeeper has in-depth knowledge of his or her premises and in-
ventory, has a financial motivation to thwart potential shoplifters, and
generally has no concurrent motivation to wrongfully detain a customer.
Put differently, the shopkeeper gains nothing—and likely loses business
overall—by detaining innocent customers.
The second tenet of shopkeeper’s privilege is a merchant’s ability to
detain a suspect for a reasonable period of time.183  Courts are hesitant to
enunciate precisely what constitutes a reasonable amount of time,184 but
it is generally considered to be the amount of time it takes to sufficiently
investigate the suspect and determine whether he or she has committed a
crime.185  This standard is largely deferential to the shopkeeper.186
180 See Pasquinelli v. Target Corp., No. 2:08-CV-163-TS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117331,
at *22 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 15, 2009) (indicating that probable cause requires only a substantial
probability of criminal activity, not actual proof that the activity occurred (citing Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13 (1983)). Compare Moore v. Federated Retail Holdings, Inc.,
No. 6:07-cv-1557-Orl-31GJK, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3500, at *11–12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 20,
2009) (“Probable cause need not be based on firsthand knowledge and the receipt of informa-
tion from someone whom it seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth is adequate.”), with
Cruz v. Johnson, 823 A.2d 1157, 1160–61 (R.I. 2003) (stating that the privilege to detain a
suspected shopkeeper exists only if a merchant or its agent actually observes any person shop-
lifting or attempting to shoplift).
181 See Guijosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 6 P.3d 583, 592 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
that the probable cause requirement under a Washington statute was to be treated as a question
of fact determined on a case-by-case basis).
182 See Snyder v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 580 F. App’x 458, 459 (6th Cir. 2014) (deter-
mining that observing a suspect in a high-theft area contributed to probable cause); Riley v.
Wilbanks, No. 4:12cv62, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58343, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2013)
(finding probable cause when a woman placed her finger over a barcode to prevent the register
from scanning); Moore, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3500, at *13–14 (deciding that a man wearing
a fleece jogging suit on a hot day, coupled with a visible price tag, sufficed as probable cause).
183 See Guijosa, 6 P.3d at 592–93 (holding that a reasonable amount of time to detain a
suspected shoplifter is to be determined on the facts of each case, but that the twenty to thirty
minutes the suspect was detained was reasonable because the shopkeeper was engaging in an
investigation of possible shoplifting while also waiting for the police to arrive to question the
suspect).
184 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Resendez, 962 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tex. 1998) (deciding
the temporal reasonableness of the current detention without indicating the outer parameters of
a permissible time period for detention).
185 See Raiford v. May Dep’t Stores, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 527, 529 (Tex. App. 1999) (stating
that a reasonable amount of time is determined by how long it takes to search the suspect,
check the store inventory, and await the arrival of police to investigate the suspect further).
186 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Cockrell, 61 S.W.3d 774, 778 (Tex. App. 2001) (stating
that the burden of proof to establish that a detainment was unreasonable is on the suspect, and
that a shopkeeper would be presumptively reasonable in detaining a suspect until the suspect’s
guilt or innocence could be ascertained).  But see Pasquinelli v. Target Corp., No. 2:08-CV-
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The final tenet of the shopkeeper’s privilege is that the detention
must be conducted in a reasonable manner.187  The use of force is one
factor that contributes to detaining a suspected shoplifter in a reasonable
manner.188  Use of force in the realm of shopkeeper’s privilege is treated
the same as with citizen’s arrests in general—the arrestor may use force
to ensure the detainment of the arrestee, but only such force as is re-
quired to prevent the arrestee’s escape.189  Courts usually assess whether
the force used was reasonable on a case-by-case basis.190  Allowing the
use of reasonable force makes sense; shoplifters caught in the act are
unlikely to comply while waiting for the police to arrive.191
Another factor contributing to the detention of a suspected shop-
lifter in a reasonable manner involves whether the suspect was embar-
rassed, harassed, or humiliated during the detention process.  Some
jurisdictions hold that a shopkeeper’s privilege defense can be negated if
a suspect is harassed or is treated with rudeness.192  Further, a shop-
163-TS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117331, at *25 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 15, 2009) (noting that the
Indiana Shoplifting Detention Act dictates that a detention must last a reasonable time, and not
extend beyond the arrival of law enforcement or two hours, whichever happens first); Rhymes
v. Winn-Dixie La. Inc., 58 So. 3d 1068, 1069–70 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (stating a reasonable
amount of time cannot exceed sixty minutes, unless it is reasonable under the circumstances to
detain the suspect longer).
187 See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 945 N.E.2d 295, 305 (Mass. 2011) (stating that most
state shopkeeper’s privilege statutes contain the phrase “in a reasonable manner” to describe a
detention).
188 See Guijosa, 6 P.3d at 591 (“[T]he authority to make the arrest . . . must necessarily
carry with it the privilege of using all reasonable force to effect it.” (quoting State v. Miller,
698 P.2d 554, 795 (Wash. 1985))); Hainz v. Shopko Stores, Inc., 359 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1984) (concluding that a reasonable manner does not allow using unjustifiable force
or physical detention in a dark room).
189 See Gortarez v. Smitty’s Super Valu, Inc., 680 P.2d 807, 814–15 (Ariz. 1984) (holding
that a shopkeeper must first demand return of the stolen property before resorting to physical
force and that, even then, the force used must be evaluated under a reasonableness standard
given all the circumstances of the case and must not be “calculated to inflict serious bodily
harm”); see also LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 215(A)(1) (2014) (“A . . . merchant . . . may
use reasonable force to detain a person for questioning on the merchant’s premises . . . .”);
MINN. STAT. § 629.366(1)(c) (West 2015) (“The person detained shall . . . not be subjected to
unnecessary or unreasonable force . . . .”).
190 Compare Ferdinand v. Save-A-Lot/Supervalu, No. 07-3305, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30683, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2008) (deciding that grabbing a suspect’s hand to stop her
from leaving with shoplifted merchandise was reasonable), with Altman v. Knox Lumber Co.,
381 N.W.2d 858, 863 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a jury could easily conclude that
unreasonable force was used when a twenty-eight-year-old weightlifter pinned a seventy-three-
year-old man to his chair because he refused to surrender his utility knife).
191 See Rogers, 945 N.E.2d at 306 (noting that the shopkeeper’s privilege would be mean-
ingless without the ability to use reasonable force).
192 See Poole v. City of Prentiss, No. 2:07cv74-KS-MTP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62795,
at *7 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 14, 2008) (stating that the Mississippi Supreme Court has ruled that the
shopkeeper’s privilege does not give a merchant the right to embarrass or harass a suspect in a
rude public manner); Adams v. Zayre Corp., 499 N.E.2d 678, 685 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (indicat-
ing that rudeness and harassment of suspects are factors that can lead to a finding of unreason-
ableness); Hainz v. Shopko Stores, Inc., 359 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (stating
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keeper’s detainment of a suspect can be unreasonable if it occurs outside
the immediate vicinity of the retail location.193
The deference shown by courts and legislatures, however, does not
grant shopkeepers carte blanche to detain suspects without fear of legal
reprisal.  Careless merchants can be found liable for false imprisonment
if they wrongfully or unreasonably detain a suspect.194  This relates to
the general public policy surrounding the shopkeeper’s privilege.  Shop-
keepers have the benefit of the doubt when detaining a suspect for a
reasonable amount of time based on probable cause.  But they lose this
presumption when the arrest takes place off the premises, or when exces-
sive force is used to detain a suspect.
Shopkeepers can protect themselves against wrongful imprisonment
and other criminal and civil charges by having the suspect sign a volun-
tary waiver.195  This waiver acts as a quid pro quo, absolving the
merchant of civil liability for false imprisonment in return for absolving
the alleged shoplifter of criminal charges.196  Such a waiver allows for
the detainment of a suspect until his or her actual guilt is ascertained, but
without the use of force to effectuate a citizen’s arrest.  One crucial as-
pect of the waiver, however, is that it must be voluntary; the suspect
cannot be coerced into signing it.197  If the alleged offender is led to
believe that he or she will not be allowed to leave the premises unless the
waiver is signed, it is deemed overly coercive and therefore not enforcea-
ble.198  Thus, while an alleged shoplifter can voluntarily waive the right
to bring false imprisonment claims later, he or she cannot be coerced into
that, where the reasonableness of a suspect’s detention is raised, the inquiry focuses partially
on whether the shopkeeper’s behavior was rude to the point of public embarrassment).
193 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.041(A) (LexisNexis 2015); Guijosa, 6 P.3d at
589–90 (noting that the requirement that a suspect still be on the premises is an integral and
indispensable aspect of the shopkeeper’s privilege).
194 See H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Saldivar, 752 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex. App. 1988) (sus-
taining a false imprisonment claim on the ground that the suspect was not detained “under
authority of law” because the shopkeeper did not have sufficient reasonable grounds or proba-
ble cause to believe that the suspect was guilty of a crime).
195 See, e.g., 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-21(c)(1) (2015) (allowing a shopkeeper to “re-
quest a person detained for shoplifting to sign a statement waiving his or her right to bring a
civil action arising from the detention in return for a signed statement from the merchant
waiving the right to bring criminal charges based upon the alleged shoplifting”).
196 See id. (providing that any written statement must clearly notify the alleged shoplifter
of his or her right to remain silent and the right to call an attorney before signing or agreeing to
any such waiver).
197 See Bourque v. Stop & Shop Cos., 814 A.2d 320, 323 (R.I. 2003) (holding that a
waiver provided by the store exceeded what was allowed under § 11-41-21(c)(1) of title 11 of
the Rhode Island General Laws because it required the alleged shoplifter to admit to some
form of wrongdoing by signing the document).
198 See id. at 324 (noting that the “defendant’s security personnel pressured plaintiff into
signing the release by leading her to believe that she had to sign it before she would be allowed
to leave the store”).
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signing a waiver that contains a confession to a crime.199  If the suspect
is unwilling to be detained for a reasonable amount of time, the quid pro
quo waiver is another option at the merchant’s disposal.
The elements of shopkeeper’s privilege serve to curtail the abuses of
the citizen’s arrest doctrine.  The lack of incentive to wrongfully detain
customers, coupled with time, place, and manner limitations, support the
conclusion that shopkeeper’s privilege statutes should be treated as ap-
propriate exercises of the citizen’s arrest doctrine.
B. Police Outside of Jurisdiction
A police officer acting without a warrant outside of his jurisdiction
is permitted to arrest when in hot pursuit of a suspect.200  Absent the
circumstances of hot pursuit, however, the authority to make extra-juris-
dictional arrests is not as apparent.  Some states, through common law
jurisprudence, uphold a warrantless arrest by a police officer outside of
his jurisdiction if a private citizen in that situation would have been per-
mitted to make a lawful citizen’s arrest.201  Other states have opted to
enact statutory provisions specifying the occasions in which an officer
may make an arrest outside of his jurisdiction.  Pennsylvania, for exam-
ple, established a statewide municipal police jurisdiction, which be-
stowed some police power to Pennsylvania officers when outside of their
primary jurisdictions.202  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applauded
the statutory objective, stating that it “fosters local control over the po-
199 See id. at 323–24 (finding that security personnel went too far when one of them
explicitly stated, “You can’t go.  You got to sign this.”).
200 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967) (upholding a warrantless search
of the premises and arrest of the defendant because the officers had been informed that an
armed robbery had taken place and that the suspect had entered the premises “less than five
minutes before they reached it”).  The Supreme Court noted that “[s]peed here was essential”
because the police needed to ascertain quickly whether the suspect was still in the house and
whether there were other accomplices on the premises or weapons that could be used to harm
the officers or to be used in an escape. Id.
201 See State v. Stevens, 603 A.2d 1203, 1208 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992) (acknowledging that
police officers acting extraterritorially generally have the same authority as private citizens),
aff’d, 620 A.2d 789 (Conn. 1993); City of Missoula v. Iosefo, 330 P.3d 1180, 1181, 1183–84
(Mont. 2014) (noting that an off-duty police officer’s observation of the defendant’s erratic
driving allowed the police officer to make a lawful citizen’s arrest based on the threat to public
safety); State v. Updegraff, 267 P.3d 28, 32 (Mont. 2011) (“[I]n order to make a warrantless
arrest, an out-of-jurisdiction officer must meet the arrest standard that would apply to a private
person in the same circumstances, but if . . . this standard is met, the officer may then follow
the procedures applicable to peace officers in processing the arrest.”).
202 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8953(1)–(6) (2015) (authorizing extra-jurisdictional ar-
rests in six instances: (1) pursuant to a court order; (2) when “the officer is in hot pursuit of
any person for any offense which was committed . . . within his primary jurisdiction;” (3) “to
aid or assist [another] law enforcement officer;” (4) when the officer obtains the other jurisdic-
tion’s prior consent; (5) when the officer is “on official business and views an offense, or has
probable cause to believe . . . a felony, misdemeanor, breach of the peace or other act which
presents an immediate clear and present danger [has been committed];” and (6) when the
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lice, and discourages extra-territorial forays by outside law enforcement
officers who are not subject to the control of the municipality: certainly a
laudable goal.”203  Courts have interpreted the statute broadly and gener-
ally upheld extra-jurisdictional arrests.204
Similarly, Ohio enacted a statute that addresses extra-jurisdictional
arrest, but it is more restrictive than Pennsylvania’s law.205  Three re-
quirements must be met before an officer in Ohio can effectuate an extra-
jurisdictional arrest: (1) the officer must pursue the offender without un-
reasonable delay after the offense is committed; (2) the offense must be
committed within the officer’s jurisdiction; and (3) the offense must be a
felony, misdemeanor, or any offense chargeable pursuant to section
4510.036 of the Revised Code (dealing with motor vehicle violations).206
Consequently, the officer must possess reasonable suspicion or probable
cause of criminal conduct within his or her own jurisdiction, otherwise
the subsequent stop and arrest would be improper under the extra-juris-
dictional statute.207  Pennsylvania and Ohio enacted these provisions to
avoid impeding the duties of law enforcement officers, as well as to pro-
vide explicit accountability for officers making extra-jurisdictional
arrests.
Despite the general rule that a police officer acting outside his juris-
diction essentially acts like a private citizen in making arrests, the officer
is still limited by constitutional requirements, particularly the Fourth
Amendment, even though a private citizen would not be similarly re-
stricted.208  In addition, some states hold that the use of the indicia of the
office or the apparent authority of police officers precludes the use of the
state’s private citizen arrest statute to validate the extra-jurisdictional ar-
officer “views an offense which is a felony, or has probable cause to believe . . . a felony has
been committed”).
203 Commonwealth v. Merchant, 595 A.2d 1135, 1138 n.7 (Pa. 1991).
204 See, e.g., id. at 1138 (applying the rules of statutory construction before concluding
that the Act should be liberally construed); Commonwealth v. Sestina, 546 A.2d 109, 112 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988) (stating that the Act must be liberally construed because its purpose is to
expand rather than limit local police power); Commonwealth v. Ebersole, 492 A.2d 436, 438
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (deciding that the statute must be liberally construed to effectuate its
purpose and promote justice).
205 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(D) (LexisNexis 2015).
206 Id.
207 See State v. Coppock, 659 N.E.2d 837, 841–42 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (finding that the
officer failed to comply with Ohio’s extra-jurisdictional arrest statute because the officer did
not obtain probable cause that the defendant was intoxicated until outside of his jurisdiction).
In addition, the officer violated the statute because he did not initiate his pursuit of the defen-
dant until he was outside of his territorial boundaries. Id. at 842.  The officer testified that he
decided to stop the defendant once she was outside of his jurisdiction and that, prior to that
point, he was “just observing her.” Id.
208 See, e.g., Graham v. State, 406 So. 2d 503, 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (invalidating
an extra-jurisdictional arrest of the suspect because the officers had made a warrantless entry
into his home in making the arrest).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-3\CJP301.txt unknown Seq: 35 31-MAY-16 15:53
2016] A NARROWED SCOPE OF CITIZEN’S ARREST 591
rest. The Supreme Court of Illinois, for example, determined that an of-
ficer’s use of a radar gun invalidated an otherwise lawful extra-
jurisdictional arrest because radar guns were limited to the use of police
officers and “was an assertion of the officer’s police authority.”209  A
District Court of Appeal in Florida invalidated an extra-jurisdictional ar-
rest for growing and possessing marijuana.  The officers did not obtain
the evidence for the arrest until they gained entrance to the defendant’s
motel room pursuant to their official position as police officers.210  The
court concluded that the defendant did not let the officers into his motel
room as private citizens, but rather as police officers, since the officers
were dressed in their uniforms.211  If the officers in this case had been
undercover and not dressed in their official uniform, the arrest would
have been upheld as a viable citizen’s arrest.212  A subsequent ruling
clarified that an officer is permitted to make an extra-jurisdictional arrest
even if dressed in uniform, but only if the evidence for making the arrest
could have been obtained by a private citizen.213  As these cases illus-
trate, courts believe that police officers making arrests outside of their
jurisdiction, even when abiding by state authority, are not truly private
citizens and, therefore, cannot rely on the doctrine of citizen’s arrest.
However, if an officer does not rely on his or her authority as a law
enforcement officer, but instead acts as a private citizen, then he or she
can make an extra-jurisdictional arrest.
209 People v. Lahr, 589 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ill. 1992).  The court noted that it was possible
for a private citizen to obtain a radar gun, but dismissed this notion as a remote possibility. Id.
210 Collins v. State, 143 So. 2d 700, 702–03 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).  Once the officers
entered the room, they saw a marijuana plant in plain view and seized other incriminating
evidence after searching the room. Id. at 702.
211 Id. at 703 (indicating that the officers showed up at the defendant’s door in uniform
“signifying their official position as police officers”).
212 Cf. State v. Crum, 323 So. 2d 673, 674 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (noting that the
officer was not wearing a uniform and was working undercover at the time of the arrest before
concluding that the officer “was substantially in the same position as any private citizen”).  In
this case, the defendant wanted to suppress the evidence collected subsequent to his arrest on
the grounds that the officer had no authority to make the extraterritorial arrest. Id. at 673.  The
court concluded that the officer had held himself out as a private citizen and had not used his
official powers as a police officer in making the arrest or collecting the incriminating evidence.
Id. at 674.
213 See State v. Phoenix, 428 So. 2d 262, 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (“When officers
outside their jurisdiction have sufficient grounds to make a valid citizen’s arrest, the law
should not require them to discard the indicia of their position before chasing and arresting a
fleeing felon.”); see also State v. Williams, 366 So. 2d 135, 136–37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(acknowledging that, while the officer was outside of his jurisdiction and dressed in his uni-
form at the time of the arrest, the evidence needed for the arrest was acquired merely by
looking for and finding the vehicle that matched the license plate number of the getaway car
used in a robbery—information that also would have been readily available to a private
citizen).
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C. Private Police Forces
The privatization of police forces reflects a societal desire to accom-
plish public law enforcement tasks at a local level.214  Companies hire
security guards to protect their business premises, investigate crimes, and
deter criminal behavior.215  Colleges and shopping malls hire guards to
patrol the campus grounds and monitor shoppers in department stores.216
Private police forces are employed in response to the failures of the pub-
lic criminal justice system and an overall diminished police presence in
certain areas.217  Neighborhoods armed with ample resources hire private
police forces to patrol and protect their communities.218  Ensuring a
sense of safety and security, private police forces fill a gap that public
police officers often cannot fill.219
At the same time, these groups operate in a grey area of the law in
which the only oversight stems from the desires and needs of their em-
ployers.220  Private police forces are subject to tort and criminal law doc-
trines such as assault, trespass, and false imprisonment, instead of the
constitutional requirements that govern public police conduct.221  Moreo-
ver, these private security officers undergo little, if any, security or weap-
ons training and often are not instructed on proper arrest procedures or
limitations on their power.222  As a result, the actions of private police
214 Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 917 (2007)
(“‘[P]rivate police’ are everywhere: conducting residential security patrols; monitoring shop-
pers in department stores; safeguarding warehouses; patrolling college campuses and shopping
malls; and guarding factories, casinos, office parks, schools, and parking lots.”).
215 See generally Finegan, supra note 161, at 98–99 (describing the current trend toward R
employing for-profit officers to provide additional security to areas in which public police
resources are inadequate).
216 See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Jacobson, The Model Campus Police Jurisdiction Act: Toward
Broader Jurisdiction for University Police, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 39, 46 (1995)
(describing the evolution of campus police in the United States); Michael Barbaro, Hot Off the
Shelves: Shoplifting Gangs Are Retailing’s Top Enemy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2005), http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/business/08theft.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing retail
security efforts).
217 See Simmons, supra note 214, at 924 (“Both the shift in attitude regarding public and R
private police and the dramatic growth in the private security industry can be traced to the
failure of the public criminal justice system to satisfy the needs of the citizens.”).
218 See Finegan, supra note 161, at 100–06 (addressing an overall dissatisfaction with R
public policing).
219 See Simmons, supra note 214, at 924 (“Frequently, the reason for turning to private R
law enforcement may be dissatisfaction not only with the level of response but also with the
outcome or the method of response.”).
220 Id. at 924–25 (contrasting the goals of public law enforcement with the goals of pri-
vate actors).  While “ensuring a fair and just criminal justice process” is a goal of public law
enforcement, it is not likely a key objective of private security groups. See Finegan, supra
note 161, at 100. R
221 Finegan, supra note 161, at 106 (“The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amend- R
ments all limit an officer’s ability to intrude upon the civil liberties of a criminal suspect.”).
222 See id. at 99.
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officers are not restricted in the same way and do not have the same
oversight as the actions of public police officers.223  To be sure, private
policing has sometimes compromised private citizen’s rights.224
Since private security forces are not employed by the state, they are
not subject to the same constitutional limitations as the police.225  But
these entities could gain accountability if legislatures enacted specific
laws to govern their activities or if public law enforcement authorities
entered into agreements with the private actors operating within their ju-
risdictions.  While private security groups are somewhat unregulated
(since, for example, they are not required to report the number of stops
and arrests made),226 their activities are confined to the oversight of their
private employers.
Although private police forces generate the potential for abuse, their
presence and function arguably are greatly needed.227  By limiting their
power and instituting a comprehensive framework that includes in-
creased training and oversight, these groups can become more effective
and reliable.  Currently, these actors receive little pay, as the positions
often do not require a high level of training or education.228  Private po-
lice forces could become more acceptable by increasing the required
training of their personnel to, for instance, 400 hours or more—roughly
223 Joan E. Marshall, Comment, The At-Will Employee and Coerced Confessions of Theft:
Extending Fifth Amendment Protection to Private Security Guard Abuse, 96 DICK. L. REV. 37,
44–45 (1991) (“When faced with issues of private security misconduct, most courts have held
that the actions of private security agents are private actions, and thus the Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments do not apply.”); see also Commonwealth v. Corley, 491 A.2d 829,
830 (Pa. 1985) (finding that the exclusionary rule does not suppress evidence obtained by a
private security officer executing a citizen’s arrest); Commonwealth v. Green, 63 Pa. D. &
C.2d 388, 392 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1973) (deciding that private security guards are not required to
give Miranda warnings when questioning individuals).
224 See generally Marshall, supra note 223, at 44–47 (providing examples of private se- R
curity agents abusing their powers, such as interrogating and threatening employees who were
accused of stealing from the company).
225 See Finegan, supra note 161, at 105–07 (arguing that private citizens effectuating R
citizen’s arrests do not require the same level of suspicion that a police officer must have in
order to “justify an intrusion into an individual’s freedom of movement”).  Procedural safe-
guards exist to ensure that public police officers conform their conduct to the rules of criminal
procedure. Id. at 111.
226 See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1278–79 (1999)
(arguing that states should require private police groups to “file regular, public reports on their
activities”).  Information regarding the number of individuals questioned, the type of searches
conducted, or the number of suspects handed over to the police are important to hold these
groups accountable for their actions. Id.
227 While it is clear that private police forces need to have more oversight and undergo
more hours of training, they have become an integral part of our society, and as such often
provide essential services in places in which the public police simply do not have adequate
resources to operate.
228 See Manuel Gamiz, Jr., Private Security Industry Grows as Pay Rate Stays Flat,
MORNING CALL (Mar. 9, 2008), http://www.mcall.com/business/outlook/all-security-030908-
story.html.
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half that of public police officers.229  Increased training can ensure that
private police are able to perform their jobs in an appropriate and respon-
sible manner.  As discussed in the next section, the Virginia Legislature
has enacted a statute that puts the Commonwealth in the forefront of
providing accountability for private police forces.230
D. Special Conservators of the Peace
Recognizing the increased role of non-traditional actors in law en-
forcement, Virginia created the legal designation of “Special Conservator
of the Peace” (“SCOP”) to grant legal authority to private actors and,
most importantly, to make them accountable to the public.231  Citizens or
legal aliens at least eighteen years of age must submit an application to
their local circuit courts for approval and must meet several requirements
before they can be appointed as a SCOP.232  Recently, the Virginia Leg-
islature passed a bill affecting the training and regulation of the SCOPs;
the number of training hours increased from 40 to 130,233 and SCOP
candidates are required to register with the Department of Criminal Jus-
tice Services for fingerprinting, drug testing, and background checks.234
The training includes a basic overview of criminal law, specifying the
elements of certain crimes; Virginia law and regulations regarding
SCOPs; proper firearm and shotgun handling; and the use of deadly
force.235
The approval order issued by the judge236 states that the SCOP has
“all the powers, functions, duties, responsibilities and authority of any
other conservator of the peace,” and defines the geographical boundaries
of the SCOP’s authority.237  In other words, in the jurisdiction, which in
229 See Justin Jouvenal, Private Police Carry Guns and Make Arrests, and Their Ranks
Are Swelling, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/pri
vate-police-carry-guns-and-make-arrests-and-their-ranks-are-swelling/2015/02/28/29f6e02e-
8f79-11e4-a900-9960214d4cd7_story.html (indicating that municipal police officers in the
state of Virginia require between 580 and 1200 hours of training).
230 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-13 (2015).
231 See id. (delineating, among other things, the authority, registration, and jurisdiction of
the SCOPs); MATTHEW AUGUST LEFANDE, COMMONWEALTH PROTECTION INSTITUTE, SPECIAL
CONSERVATORS OF THE PEACE UNDER CODE OF VIRGINIA § 19.2-13, at 18–19 (2006), http://
www.commonwealthprotection.org/scoppaper.pdf (stating that the SCOPs were meant to
breach the inherent disconnect between the need for private security forces and their dimin-
ished authority to act as public police officers within the state).
232 See Special Conservators of the Peace, VA. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., http://
www.dcjs.virginia.gov/pss/special/scop.cfm (last visited Jan. 21, 2016).
233 S.B. 1195, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2015); see Special Conservators of the
Peace, supra note 232. R
234 Special Conservators of the Peace, supra note 232. R
235 Id.
236 A judge has discretion to deny an appointment for good cause. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-13(A) (2015).
237 Id.
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most cases is a specific piece of real property,238 a SCOP can effectuate
an arrest just as a public police officer could.  A sheriff or chief of police
who sponsors an application may request that the SCOP operate within a
broader geographic jurisdiction limited to the city or county in which the
application was made.239  SCOPs are permitted to wear badges and
uniforms displaying the title “police,” as long as they first receive per-
mission from the court.240
Notwithstanding the official authority conferred upon these private
actors and the doubling of their numbers to about 750 in the last dec-
ade,241 issues concerning accountability and management of the SCOPs
remain.  For example, there is no state authority that continuously
monitors their activities, nor is there a grievance board to address com-
plaints of abusive conduct.242  Moreover, citizens may assume that
SCOPs who look and act like police officers represent the city or the
county, which might be confusing and could impact a community’s rela-
tionship with public police—especially in cases in which power is
abused.243  Another issue is the disparity between the amount of training
that SCOPs and police officers receive, even though both are authorized
to perform arrests.  The SCOPs sponsored by sheriffs are potentially un-
restricted by the bounds of a specific physical location, giving them free
rein to function in an official law enforcement capacity, but without com-
parable training.
Despite the shortcomings in the current legislation governing
SCOPs in Virginia, however, their statutory recognition and appointment
by a judge provide needed legitimacy and create important procedural
safeguards.  As it stands, the SCOP framework embraces many of the
features that could serve as a model for private police requirements.  If
all private police forces were limited to specific pieces of real property,
had full employer accountability, and received adequate state-mandated
training, these entities would have an appropriate amount of power to
arrest—with the corresponding amount of training—and the potential for
abuse of this power would be limited.  These principles, combined with
238 Application for Appointment of Special Conservator of the Peace, SUP. CT. OF VA.,
http://www.courts.state.va.us/forms/circuit/cc1430.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (requiring
applicants to specify the proposed geographical limitations of their authority, including the
address and a description of the real property to which their authority is confined).
239 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-13(F).
240 Id. § 19.2-13(A) (“[T]he order may also provide that the special conservator of the
peace may use the title ‘police’ on any badge or uniform worn in the performance of his duties
as such.”); Jouvenal, supra note 229 (describing how a local SCOP had worn a vest displaying R
the word “police” while checking in on a teenager who had gotten into trouble with
neighbors).
241 Jouvenal, supra note 229. R
242 Id.
243 Id.
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an accountability mechanism—such as a grievance board and mandatory
reporting requirements—would further reduce the risk of inappropriate
incidents and abuse.
IV. MODEL STATUTE FOR CITIZEN’S ARREST
The Anti-Vigilante Act (AVA)
§ 1 – Purpose
The purpose of this Act is to restrict the scope of the
citizen’s arrest power to minimize the confusion and
abuse associated with this power.  The Act outlines
training and authorization mechanisms required before
one may lawfully perform a citizen’s arrest.
§ 2 – Definitions
(a) Merchants: an owner or operator, and the agent, con-
signee, employee, lessee, or officer of an owner or oper-
ator, of any merchant’s premise.
(b) Private citizen: a citizen who does not hold any pub-
lic position or any public official who is not authorized
to arrest pursuant to his or her official duties.
(c) Private police officers: law enforcement officers em-
ployed and/or controlled by non-governmental entities
responsible for promoting public safety, and preventing
and detecting crime.
(d) Public police officers: law enforcement officers em-
ployed by the government responsible for preserving
public order, promoting public safety, and preventing
and detecting crime.
§ 3 – Power to arrest
(a) Private citizens other than those listed in (b) shall not
have the power to arrest.
(b) The following categories of persons shall have the
power to arrest:
(1) merchants;
(2) private police officers; and
(3) public police officers outside of their jurisdiction.
§ 4 – Merchants
(a) A merchant may detain an individual on the premises
of his or her establishment if the merchant has reasona-
ble grounds for believing that the individual has stolen
property from the establishment.
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(b) A merchant may detain a suspect only for a reasona-
ble amount of time and in a reasonable manner until the
suspect’s guilt can be definitively ascertained.
§ 5 – Private police officers
(a) A private police officer may detain an individual
within the physical location determined by the officer’s
employer if the officer has reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that the individual committed a felony or
misdemeanor.
(b) Individuals must be certified by the state in order to
take on the role of private police officer. A private police
officer must complete the following requirements in or-
der to attain certification:
(1) individuals must register with [the state entity that
oversees the implementation of private police training
and employment activities];
(2) individuals must complete no less than [specified
number of hours] of training. Training should include
information on general principles of criminal law and
constitutional law, when private police officers can
make arrests within their jurisdiction, the limits on the
use of force in making arrests, the jurisdiction’s law
on self-defense and defense of others, the use of
deadly force, and the proper use of firearms;
(3) individuals must complete a background check, a
drug test, and register fingerprints with [the appropri-
ate state entity]; and
(4) individuals must petition [the appropriate state en-
tity] to complete the certification process and confirm
their employment jurisdiction.
§ 6 – Public police officers outside their jurisdiction
A public police officer may arrest an offender outside
the officer’s jurisdiction:
(a) when in immediate pursuit of an offender for an of-
fense committed within the officer’s jurisdiction;
(b) while aiding or assisting another public police of-
ficer; or
(c) when the officer witnesses a felony or misdemeanor
or has probable cause to believe that a felony or misde-
meanor has been committed.
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Commentary
1. Definitions – The definitions in section 2 have been adapted from
various state statutes and legal authorities.  In particular, the definition of
merchants under subsection 2(a) is derived from the Nevada statute deal-
ing with shopkeeper’s privilege. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 597.850(1)(b)
(2014).  The definition of public police officer in subsection 2(d) is de-
rived from BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
2. Shopkeeper’s privilege – Arrest powers for merchants listed in
subsections 4(a)–(b) are based on the requirements commonly seen in
shopkeeper’s privilege statutes. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-10-14(a)
(2015); IND. CODE § 35-33-6-2(a)(1)(A) (2015).
3. Private police officers – The requirements for private police of-
ficer training and authorization in section 5 are loosely adapted from the
Virginia statute on special conservators of the peace (“SCOPs”). See
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-13 (2015).  Currently, SCOPs must undergo 130
hours of training, but this number should be increased in order to obtain
adequate information on criminal law, arrest procedures, and firearms.
While the SCOP statute requires individuals to petition the courts and
register with the Department of Criminal Justice Services to achieve
SCOP status, this method is but one example of how individuals can be
trained and authorized by a state to act as private police officers.
4. Public police officers outside their jurisdictions – The statutory
recommendations related to when public police officers can arrest
outside their jurisdiction listed in section 6 are roughly based on Ohio
and Pennsylvania statutes that address extra-jurisdictional arrest powers.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(D) (LexisNexis 2015); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8953(1)–(6) (2015).
CONCLUSION
The logic underlying the citizen’s arrest doctrine at the time of its
creation was sound.  In medieval England, allowing private citizens to
enforce local law reflected the lack of an organized police force and
helped to create order and safety.  Limited mobility and technology made
a widespread police force infeasible, and the citizen’s arrest doctrine
arose to fulfill a need.  As organized police slowly became the norm,
however, the common law citizen’s arrest doctrine became outdated and
was no longer an essential component for the maintenance of law and
order.  Individual jurisdictions in the United States handled this trend
differently, with some honing the common law doctrine through case law
while others limited its scope through statutory codification.  Either way,
the goal of the states was the same: to curtail the citizen’s arrest doctrine
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and place law enforcement power where it belonged—in the hands of the
police.
Despite this sensible trend, citizen’s arrest remains legal throughout
the United States.  Yet the requirements of a lawful citizen’s arrest,
whether through case law or codification, are insufficiently clear to allow
the average citizen to navigate the doctrine successfully.  When applied
to the shopkeeper’s privilege, police outside their jurisdiction, or private
police and security forces, the citizen’s arrest doctrine is less ripe for
abuse because the arrestors have some level of training and may effectu-
ate arrests only in carefully prescribed areas.  These arrestors are less
likely to place themselves or their arrestees at risk because they have
superior knowledge of the laws and their powers are contained.  For the
average citizen, however, whether alone or in a watch group such as the
Guardian Angels, the doctrine presents significant potential for abuse be-
cause untrained citizens may make arrests virtually anywhere in public.
This vast power requires that the arrestor have knowledge of local felony
and misdemeanor laws as well as jurisprudential holdings regarding the
probable cause required to make an arrest, the length of detention permit-
ted, and the amount of force they are permitted to use in doing so.  To
expect the ordinary citizen to master these hurdles is unreasonable and
dangerous.
The solution is to abolish citizen’s arrest for the private citizen and
for private citizen watch groups.  It is a doctrine whose time should have
passed many decades—or centuries—ago.  In instances in which a citi-
zen’s arrest previously would have been justified, the individual or vol-
unteer watch group member could still serve as a witness and
immediately notify the police of a crime in progress.  In the age of
smartphones and other hi-tech devices, private citizens can easily gather
photographic and video evidence of a crime without subjecting them-
selves or the suspect to the risks associated with a citizen’s arrest.  Abro-
gation of the general authority to perform a citizen’s arrest would allow
the doctrine to reflect the current state of affairs in the world, just as it
did when it was first established nearly a millennium ago.  The scope of
the citizen’s arrest doctrine has ebbed and flowed in response to societal
needs throughout its history.  The best course today is to reject general
citizen’s arrest authority and to restrict its use to trained individuals in
specific contexts.
